Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 108 | Issue 2

Article 2

Spring 2018

The Local-Control Model of the Fourth
Amendment
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Local-Control Model of the Fourth Amendment, 108 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 253 (2018).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol108/iss2/2

This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons.

MANNHEIMER_READY FOR TECHNICAL REVIEW

4/5/18 8:33 PM

0091-4169/18/10802-0253
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 2018 by Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer

Vol. 108, No. 2
Printed in U.S.A.

THE LOCAL-CONTROL MODEL OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
MICHAEL J. ZYDNEY MANNHEIMER*
Fourth Amendment doctrine has been home to two competing models:
the Warrant Model and the Reasonableness Model. The Warrant Model,
emphasizing the Amendment’s Warrant Clause, holds that search and arrest
via warrant is the preferred method and the default rule, though allowing for
exceptions when obtaining a warrant is impracticable. The Reasonableness
Model, which stresses the Amendment’s Reasonableness Clause, holds that
the Amendment imposes a generalized reasonableness standard on searches
and seizures by which the question is not whether dispensing with a warrant
is reasonable but whether the search or seizure itself is reasonable. These
polar positions have been replicated in the scholarly literature on the history
surrounding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment. Some adhere to a
reading of the historical record that roughly supports the Warrant Model
while others have found that history more strongly supports the
Reasonableness Model.
This Article interprets the historical record differently than either of the
two dominant schools, and introduces a third model of the Fourth
Amendment: the Local-Control Model. It situates the Fourth Amendment as
the culmination of a decades-long, continent-wide struggle by Americans for
local control over search-and-seizure policy as against central authority.
And it posits the Fourth Amendment as the result of an effort on the part of
the Anti-Federalists, those who demanded a Bill of Rights, to maintain local
control over search-and-seizure policy. On this view, the Fourth Amendment
has a strong federalism component. It demands neither that federal officers
generally use warrants for searching and seizing nor that they act pursuant
to a general reasonableness standard. Rather, the Local-Control Model
supports the view that federal officers must generally follow state law in
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of Law, Northern Kentucky University. I thank Lauryn Gouldin, Larry Rosenthal, Jonathan
Witmer-Rich, Matt Tokson, and Ekow Yankah, and participants of CrimFest 2015!, held at
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conducting searches and seizures.
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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to the Fourth Amendment,1 history matters, perhaps now
more than ever. The Fourth Amendment decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court in recent years have addressed such modern phenomena as electronic
hotel registries, collection of DNA from arrestees, and GPS tracking of
suspects. Nevertheless, the Court’s opinions in these cases have witnessed
such real and imagined framing-era characters as “‘tithingmen . . . search[ing]
1

The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

MANNHEIMER 1.DOCX

4/5/18 8:33 PM

2018] LOCAL-CONTROL MODEL OF FOURTH AMENDMENT

255

public houses of entertainment on [the] Sabbath,’”2 early Americans
“open[ing] their mouths for royal inspection,”3 and, of course, the “very tiny
constable.”4
If history matters, then we ought to get that history right. There is a
plethora of available information regarding our eighteenth-century
predecessors’ law, policy, and custom on search and seizure. Nevertheless,
there is widespread disagreement over how to interpret those data. Some see
the history surrounding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment as pointing
to a general requirement that the government be reasonable when it searches
and seizes. On this view, reasonableness is determined largely by after-thefact jury determinations, not a before-the-fact warrant requirement. Others
see that history as more strongly supporting a warrant requirement as a
mechanism for judges to control the discretion of executive officers.
Neither side is entirely correct. Both types of regulation of government
officials’ conduct—a general reasonableness requirement backed by the
threat of lawsuit and a requirement that executive discretion be tightly
controlled by judicial supervision—appear in colonial America and the early
Republic. Yet to say that a system is characterized by a particular type of
regulation is far different from saying that such a regulation is either a
necessary or a sufficient component of that system. Neither dominant model
of Fourth Amendment history has captured the touchstone of the
Amendment. That touchstone is neither warrants nor reasonableness, but
local control.
This Article contends that the best way to understand the Fourth
Amendment, as a historical matter, is as a reservation of local control over
federal searches and seizures.5 While there was a general consensus by 1791
that general warrants were unlawful, search-and-seizure rules were, in other
respects, to be controlled by state law. Three episodes during the roughly
2

City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2459–60 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING
743 (2009) (alteration added)).
3
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 n.3 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
5
The word “federal” in this sentence is critical. From 1791 to 1868, the Fourth
Amendment regulated only federal searches and seizures. It is only with the adoption in 1868
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”),
that we can speak of the Fourth Amendment as controlling searches by state officials as well.
Given the focus of this Article on the history surrounding the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment in 1791, it does not attempt to thoroughly address the critical but separate issue
of how the Fourth Amendment should be thought to apply to the States. However, the Article
does offer a few brief, preliminary thoughts in that direction. See infra Section III.C.
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thirty-year period surrounding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment⎯the
writs-of-assistance controversy of the 1760s, the States’ conditional
ratifications of a national impost under the Articles of Confederation in the
1780s, and the enactment of two early federal statutes in the 1790s—each
evoke the theme of local control over central authority vis-à-vis searches and
seizures. This theme of local control dovetails almost perfectly with the
motivation of the Anti-Federalists in demanding a Bill of Rights in exchange
for their reluctant acquiescence to the Constitution: the reservation of state
power regarding the most important spheres of human activity.
Recent scholarship has begun to question the sharp dichotomy in
constitutional law between rights and structure, and to rediscover the linkages
between them.6 In isolating a powerful theme of federalism in the Fourth
Amendment, this Article is of a piece with that recent scholarship. Neither
dominant historical model of the Fourth Amendment adequately accounts for
this strong federalism component of the Bill of Rights. Only the LocalControl Model can do so.
Part I examines, and offers a brief critique of, the two dominant models
of interpreting the history surrounding the Fourth Amendment: the
Reasonableness Model and the Warrant Model. Part II discusses at length
three episodes that shed light on the original understanding of the Fourth
Amendment. The first, the writs-of-assistance controversy of the 1760s, has
been the subject of much commentary. However, few have appreciated this
episode for what it was: not a unified colonial revolt against general warrants,
but a set of particularized assertions of local control, differing by colony,
against Crown authority. The second, the States’ placement of conditions on
their ratification of a national impost under the Articles of Confederation, has
almost entirely escaped the notice of Fourth Amendment scholars. This
episode also involved particularized conditions, varying by State, placed on
central search-and-seizure authority. Finally, the enactment of section 33 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 and section nine of the Militia Act of 1792, which
explicitly calibrated federal search-and-seizure authority to that of the
respective States, suggests an understanding of the Fourth Amendment
heavily infused with federalism principles. Part III posits local control of
searches and seizures as the touchstone for each of these three episodes in the
early American experience. It attempts to demonstrate the superiority of the
Local-Control Model as a historical matter by tying these three episodes to
the federalism-based motivations of the Anti-Federalists in demanding
constraints on federal search-and-seizure authority.
6

See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as
Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012); Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad
Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 587–88 (2015).
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THE TWO DOMINANT MODELS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The central puzzle of the Fourth Amendment has always been what the
relationship is between its two clauses. The first, the Reasonableness Clause,
demands that all governmental searches and seizures of “persons, houses,
papers, and effects” be reasonable.7 The second, the Warrant Clause, spells
out three requirements before a warrant may be issued: probable cause, oath
or affirmation, and particularity.8 But what is the relationship between these
two Clauses? Some have asserted that the Amendment means that a warrant
must be used to render a search or seizure reasonable, at least presumptively.
We can call this the “Warrant Model.” Others have interpreted it to mean
that reasonableness of searches and seizures is generally to be measured
independently of whether a warrant was used, the Warrant Clause telling us
only what requirements must be met if a warrant is used. We can call this
the “Reasonableness Model.” The U.S. Supreme Court has never clearly
settled upon either view. Instead, it has paid lip service to the Warrant Model
while vacillating back and forth between the two. Moreover, adherents of
each view can find some support in the historical record surrounding
adoption of the Fourth Amendment.
A. THE WARRANT AND REASONABLENESS MODELS

In Craig Bradley’s helpful taxonomy, “there are two, and only two, ways
of looking at the [F]ourth [A]mendment” that will allow for coherence of
doctrine and consistency of application.9 What Bradley calls “the ‘no lines’
and ‘bright line’ approaches”10 roughly equate to the Reasonableness Model
and the Warrant Model. Pursuant to the former, “[a] search and seizure must
be reasonable, considering all relevant factors on a case-by-case basis.”11
Pursuant to the latter, “a warrant is always required for every search and
seizure when it is practicable to obtain one.”12
7

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See id.
9
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1471
(1985).
10
Id.
11
Id. These factors would include the level of suspicion by officials, whether they
obtained a warrant, any exigency, the nature and level of intrusion, and the gravity of the
offense being investigated. See id.
12
Id. (emphasis omitted). This is not to say that these are the only two possible models
for the Fourth Amendment. For example, Professor Erik Luna has posited an “individual
sovereignty” model and an “antidiscrimination” model, favoring the former. See Erik G. Luna,
Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 789 (1999). Professor Scott Sundby has
advanced a model based on “reciprocal government-citizen trust.” See Scott E. Sundby,
“Everyman”‘s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and
8
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Both models have found expression in the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Each has, on occasion, held dominance. Indeed,
to use Justice Scalia’s evocative language, the Court has “lurched back and
forth between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and looking to
reasonableness alone.”13 For example, in United States v. Lefkowitz, in 1932,
the Court articulated the warrant preference rule: “[T]he informed and
deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to
what searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be
preferred over the hurried action of officers and others who may happen to
make arrests.”14 Yet, a mere fifteen years later, in Harris v. United States,
the Court embraced the Reasonableness Model: “The test of reasonableness
cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms . . . The Fourth Amendment has
never been held to require that every valid search and seizure be effected
under the authority of a search warrant.”15 Less than a year later, the Court
returned to a reading of the Fourth Amendment more consistent with the
Warrant Model. It declared that “[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not
by a policeman or government enforcement agent,” unless “exceptional
circumstances” exist.16 But barely two years after that, in United States v.
Rabinowitz, the Court reversed course once more:
[T]he Constitution does not say that the right of the people to be secure in their persons
should not be violated without a search warrant if it is practicable for the officers to
procure one. The mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that the people shall be secure
against unreasonable searches.17

Rabinowitz provided something of a showcase for the battle between the
two views. For the majority, espousing the Reasonableness Model, Justice
Minton set forth the proposition that the Fourth Amendment requires
reasonableness, not warrants: “The relevant test is not whether it is
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was
Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1754 (1994). But only the Warrant and Reasonableness
Models attempt to solve the textual puzzle at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.
13
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
14
285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
15
331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947).
16
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). See also McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948) (“A search without a warrant demands exceptional
circumstances . . .”); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (“To provide the
necessary security against unreasonable intrusions upon the private lives of individuals, the
framers of the Fourth Amendment required adherence to judicial processes wherever
possible.”).
17
339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950).
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reasonable.
That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and
circumstances—the total atmosphere of the case.”18 Justice Frankfurter,
writing for himself and Justice Jackson in dissent, just as clearly set forth a
succinct statement of the Warrant Model:
When the Fourth Amendment outlawed “unreasonable searches” and then went on to
define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate
could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is
“unreasonable” unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by
19
absolute necessity.

While the Warrant Model became ascendant in the late 1960s and early
1970s,20 the debate continues sixty-six years after Rabinowitz. Different
members of the same Court express the Fourth Amendment’s central
requirement in terms of either the Reasonableness Model or the Warrant
Model, depending on his or her preferences. Indeed, one can often discern
from a Supreme Court opinion whether a Fourth Amendment claimant will
win or lose based on whether, at the outset of its Fourth Amendment analysis,
the Court describes the Amendment’s requirements in terms of the
Reasonableness Model or the Warrant Model. To take just a recent example,
here is how the majority opinion in City of Los Angeles v. Patel, written by
Justice Sotomayor, explained the provision’s requirements: “Based on [this]
constitutional text, the Court has repeatedly held that ‘searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or a magistrate
judge, are per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions.’”21 Predictably, the Court found a Fourth
Amendment violation.22 And here is how Justice Scalia in dissent described
the same requirements:
[I]n an effort to guide courts in applying the Search-and-Seizure Clause’s indeterminate
reasonableness standard . . . we have used the Warrant Clause as a guidepost for
assessing the reasonableness of a search, and have erected a framework of presumptions
applicable to broad categories of searches . . . . Our case law has repeatedly recognized,
however, that these are mere presumptions, and the only constitutional requirement is
that a search be reasonable.23

The result is an uneasy truce. The Warrant Model has won out but only
18

Id. at 66.
Id. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
20
See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 197, 204 (1993) (“The warrant preference rule grew in stature during the latter half of
the 1960’s and the early 1970’s.”).
21
135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009))
(alterations omitted).
22
See id. at 2456.
23
Id. at 2458 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19
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“rhetorically,”24 and the warrant requirement is shot through with so many
different amorphous exceptions—more than twenty, according to Bradley
writing thirty years ago25—that it is the Reasonableness Model that is truly
ascendant.26 No wonder that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been the
subject of pejoratives by so many who have written about it.27
B. HISTORICAL SUPPORT FOR THE WARRANT AND
REASONABLENESS MODELS

The Fourth Amendment cannot “be read as [it] might be read by a man
who knows English but who has no knowledge of the history that gave rise
to the words.”28 Some have looked to this history for a way out of the
wilderness. All agree that the Warrant Clause clearly forbids general
warrants, and history supports the notion that, by 1791, general warrants were
almost uniformly seen as unlawful.29 Beyond that, unfortunately, the
historical evidence regarding what else the Fourth Amendment requires is
ambiguous. Perhaps unsurprisingly, each camp can claim that the evidence
points to its preferred Fourth Amendment model.
1. History and the Reasonableness Model
The idea that history supports a model of the Fourth Amendment that
downplays warrants and plays up reasonableness has been most completely
and robustly set forth by Professor Akhil Amar. In his seminal piece, Fourth

24

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
25
Bradley, supra note 9, at 1473.
26
See Maclin, supra note 20, at 205 (“[T]he Court . . . formulates Fourth Amendment
rules around an ad hoc test, and provides only occasional lip service to the warrant preference
rule.”).
27
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits
of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149
(1998) (“a mess”); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 757 (1994) (“an embarrassment”); Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant
Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 475 (1991)
(“mired in confusion and contradiction”); Bradley, supra note 9, at 1468 (a “tarbaby”); David
E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581,
598 (2008) (“arbitrary, inconsistent, and ultimately incoherent”); Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 49 (1974) (“unstable and
unconvincing”). See also Luna, supra note 12, at 787–88 (“[E]ach doctrine is more duct tape
on the Amendment’s frame and a step closer to the junkyard.”).
28
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
29
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 637–58.
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Amendment First Principles,30 and in follow-up pieces,31 he argued not only
that warrants were not generally required for searches and seizures at the time
of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, but also that warrants were
actually disfavored, because a warrant immunized the government official
from a suit for trespass.
Amar first staked out the textual high ground: “The words of the Fourth
Amendment really do mean what they say. They do not require warrants,
even presumptively, for searches and seizures.”32 After all, the negative
phrasing of the Warrant Clause (“no warrant[] shall issue”) itself suggests
that the Amendment should be read as disfavoring, not favoring, warrants.33
He also pointed out that a number of different types of warrantless searches
and seizures were permissible in 1791: arrests,34 searches incident thereto,35
and searches aboard ships.36 He further asserted that searches performed
without warrants could be justified ex post if contraband or stolen items were
found.37
Amar argued that the language of the Fourth Amendment disfavors
warrants for good reason: warrants were issued in ex parte proceedings by a
judge “and had the purpose and effect of precluding any common law
trespass suit the aggrieved target might try to bring before a local jury.”38
30

Amar, supra note 27.
See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES (1997); see also Akhil Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of
Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 55–60 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Writs of Assistance];
Akhil Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097,
1106–11 (1998).
32
Amar, supra note 27, at 761.
33
See id. at 774; see also TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 43
(1969) (asserting that the Fourth Amendment was designed “to prohibit the	
  oppressive	
  use	
  
of	
  warrants”	
  and	
  leave	
  warrantless	
  searches	
  and	
  seizures	
  unregulated).	
  
34
See Amar, supra note 27, at 764.
35
See id. at 764–66. Search-incident-to-arrest authority surely existed in the eighteenth
century but it arguably was not as extensive as is widely thought. See Michael J.Z.
Mannheimer, The Contingent Fourth Amendment, 64 EMORY L.J. 1229, 1252–53 (2015).
36
See Amar, supra note 27, at 766–67. Amar relies upon the Collection Act of 1789 for
the proposition that warrantless searches of ship comported with the Fourth Amendment. Id.
However, reliance upon an Act of Congress, even one passed by the First Congress, to inform
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is particularly hazardous. See infra notes 193–241 and
accompanying text.
37
See Amar, supra note 27, at 767. There is a good deal of dispute over this proposition.
Compare Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 647–48 (1999) (taking issue with Amar’s account), with Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of
Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1316–24 (2010) (supporting Amar’s account).
38
Amar, supra note 27, at 772; accord Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1284 (“[T]he Framers
31
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Regulation of federal searches and seizures, he argued, would come about as
a result of after-the-fact remedial action by local juries in tort suits.39 As
such, warrants were a bad thing, not a good thing, given that they immunized
officers from suit even where a search or seizure turned out to be flagrantly
unreasonable.40 Amar concluded “that the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is not warrants but reasonableness.”41
As attractive as Amar’s account seems at first blush, it is flawed when
one digs deeper. As will be seen,42 during the writs-of-assistance controversy
in colonial North America in the 1760s, specific warrants were generally held
up by the colonists as the sine qua non of a lawful search. If Amar’s account
were correct, James Otis, the attorney for the Boston merchants who first
fought the writs of assistance in 1760, should have argued that British
customs agents were entitled to no warrants at all. Instead, he argued that
they were entitled to specific warrants.43 Likewise, colonial courts should
not have offered to issue writs of assistance as specific warrants, as several
did.44 Rather, they should have refused to issue writs at all.
Even putting this to one side, Amar’s historical account is implausible.
The keystone of his claim that warrants were disfavored is that the bulk of
search-and-seizure policy was to be determined ex post by juries on a caseby-case basis. But intricate sets of rules—common-law and statutory—
regarding when warrants were and were not required were already in place at
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.45 These rules allowed
arrests and searches without warrants in some circumstances and required
warrants in others.46 True, where there was no warrant to immunize the
person conducting the search or seizure, the jury determined whether the
search or seizure was reasonable. But to say that the common law posited
the jury as the principal architect of search-and-seizure policy captures only
a piece of the picture, and minimizes the extent to which the common law
kept a good many cases from juries by providing for search and seizure via
warrant.

sought to limit access to warrants because they immunized officers from suits challenging the
propriety of their searches.”).
39
See Amar, supra note 27, at 774.
40
See id. (“[A] lawful warrant would provide . . . an absolute defense in any subsequent
trespass suit.”).
41
Id. at 771.
42
See infra Section II.A.
43
See infra text accompanying notes 92–95.
44
See infra text accompanying notes 112, 114–115.
45
See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1246–56, 1261–62.
46
Id.
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Moreover, the founding generation understood as well as we do that tort
suits are a blunt instrument of regulation and that after-the-fact remedies
could offer only imperfect redress.47 Indeed, this very argument was made
amidst the writs-of-assistance controversy, likely by Otis himself, in a
column published in the Boston Gazette on January 4, 1762.48 Otis asked
what “reparation” a petty officer would make “after he has put a family . . . to
the utmost confusion and terror . . . [without] just grounds of suspicion.”49
He continued,
is it enough to say, that damages may be recover’d against him in the law? I hope
indeed this will always be the case; — but are we perpetually to be expos’d to outrages
of this kind, [and] to be told for our only consolation, that we must be perpetually
seeking to the courts of law for redress? Is not this vexation itself?50

The risk of under-deterrence is amplified when one considers how
unlikely it was that the victim of a purportedly unlawful search would bring
a tort action. Amar can point to only a handful of reported cases in British
North America in which such an action was brought.51 The showcase
litigation for his theory, instead, is the Wilkesite set of cases, a series of
litigations brought in Britain against Crown officials.52 The plaintiffs in those
cases, however, were a prominent Member of Parliament and his close
associates. Much as those cases might have set a precedent and deterred
future Crown officials from violating the rights of all British subjects,53 it is
unlikely that search-and-seizure law can be fine-tuned based solely on tort
suits brought by the well-placed few with the resources and wherewithal to
bring such actions.

47

See Davies, supra note 37, at 589 (“Like modern judges, the Framers understood that
no post-search remedy could adequately restore the breached security of the house.”).
48
See JOSIAH QUINCY, JUNIOR, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761
AND 1772 488–94 (1865) (reprinting the column and speculating that Otis had written it); see
also Davies, supra note 37, at 561 n.20 (surmising that Otis wrote the column).
49
QUINCY, supra note 48, at 490.
50
Id. Otis also pointed out that some intangible harms, such as poor treatment by a petty
executive officer during a search, were non-compensable. See id. (“[M]ay we not be insolently
treated by our petty tyrants in some ways, for which the law prescribes no redress?”).
51
See Amar, supra note 27, at 786 n.105. If Amar were correct, “there should be
thousands of such cases, and evidence of them should be easy to find. The only evidence so
far produced is [a] ‘smattering of nineteenth-century cases,’ . . . not the avalanche of cases that
a flourishing system would generate.” Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 1176–77.
52
See Amar, supra note 27, at 772, 775–76, 797–98.
53
See id. at 797 (observing that the Wilkes plaintiffs “had recovered a King’s ransom from
civil juries to teach arrogant officialdom a lesson and to deter future abuse”).
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2. History and the Warrant Model
Some of those who advocate for the Warrant Model agree that history
offers a guide. But they tend to pull the camera back on the specific practices
of the framers in order to view the general zeitgeist during the framing period
vis-à-vis search-and-seizure policy.54 As Justice Frankfurter remarked in his
famed Rabinowitz dissent, the Fourth Amendment “was the answer of the
Revolutionary statesmen to the evils of searches without warrants and
searches with warrants unrestricted in scope.
Both were deemed
‘unreasonable.’”55 The colonists recoiled at the use of general warrants.56
But it would make little sense to think that Americans during the framing
period reacted so violently to general warrants yet calmly accepted searches
and seizures performed with no warrant at all. The chief vice of both general
warrants and warrantless searches and seizures is that they afforded unlimited
discretion to low-level executive officials: constables and customs collectors.
Both general warrants and unwarranted searches and seizures “place[d] the
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.”57 Thus, the
argument goes, “[t]he Fourth Amendment was . . . adopted for the purpose of
checking discretionary police authority.”58 The idea was to “‘place[] the
magistrate as a buffer between the police and the citizenry.’”59 Thus, to
54

See Maclin, supra note 20, at 213 (exhorting the Court not to “be preoccupied with the
permissible law enforcement practices of the eighteenth century” but rather to “focus on the
‘underlying vision’ of the amendment” (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 537 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis omitted)); Tracey Maclin, The Complexity
of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 958 (1997) (“History is
relevant not because it offers irrefutable answers to current constitutional questions, but
because it provides guidance on the broad values that underlie the Constitution’s text.”).
55
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
56
Hon. M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief
that Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 921 (2010).
57
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis., J., dissenting) (quoting
Otis’s argument against Writs of Assistance).
58
Michael, supra note 56, at 921–22; see also Maclin, supra note 20, at 229 (“The framers
declared a broad principle about government power in guaranteeing freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure. Under that broad principle, government authority and
discretion would not go unchecked.”).
59
Maclin, supra note 20, at 213–14 (quoting Jacob W. Landynski, In Search of Justice
Black’s Fourth Amendment, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 462 (1976)). In a variation on this
theme, Professor Thomas Davies has contended that the Reasonableness Clause referred only
to the inherent illegality of searches pursuant to general warrants, see Davies, supra note 37,
at 551, but that warrantless searches and arrests were understood as being regulated by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-andSeizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the
Original Understanding of “Due Process of Law,” 77 MISS. L.J. 1, 7–8 (2007). In another
variation, Professor David Steinberg has asserted that the Fourth Amendment was intended to
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Warrant Clause advocates, the Fourth Amendment is largely about the checks
and balances that go with separation of powers: controlling executive
discretion through judicial superintendence.
But while a preference for judicial oversight of petty executive authority
can be gleaned from the colonial opposition to writs of assistance and general
search warrants, such a preference cannot be stated as a general rule
applicable to all searches and seizures. First, warrantless arrests were
common during the framing period. As long as a felony had in fact been
committed, and there was reasonable grounds to believe the arrestee had
committed it, warrantless arrest was perfectly acceptable.60 Indeed, even the
felony-in-fact requirement was breaking down during the late eighteenth
century.61 Warrantless arrests for felonies could also be made in most
jurisdictions based on “[t]he common Fame of the Country,” that is, based
on general reputation.62 Moreover, in most jurisdictions warrantless arrest of
a person who was actually guilty of a felony was always justified, even if
based upon no suspicion at all.63 Warrantless arrests could also be made in
some jurisdictions for such lesser offenses as vagrancy,64 “disturbing the
Minister in Time of Divine Service,”65 “profane[] swear[ing],”66 “begging,”67
prostitution,68 fortune-telling and practicing other “crafty science,”69
“‘hawking’ and ‘peddling,’”70 and violations of the Sabbath.71 None of these
crime categories requires the kind of swift action that would make obtaining

require warrants, but only with respect to searches of houses. See David E. Steinberg, The
Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1053
(2004) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment was intended to proscribe only a single, discrete activity—
physical searches of houses pursuant to a general warrant, or no warrant at all.”).
60
See Davies, supra note 37, at 633–35.
61
See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1238–40, 1248–49.
62
See id. at 1251. However, if a subsequent tort action were brought for false arrest, the
defendant was required to introduce “evidence . . . that such fame had some probable
ground.”). See id. at 1251 n.100 (quoting JAMES PARKER, CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE
OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, HIGH-SHERIFFS, UNDER-SHERIFFS,
CORONERS, CONSTABLES, GAOLERS, JURY-MEN, AND OVERSEERS OF THE POOR 26 (1764)).
63
See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1255.
64
See id. at 1251–52.
65
Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case
Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago
Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 305, 306 n.205 (2002).
66
Id. at 332 n.284.
67
Id.
68
See id. at 343 n.322.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 353.
71
See id. at 350.
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a warrant impracticable, at least not as a general matter. The law was unclear
even as to whether doors could be broken to make a warrantless arrest.72
Based on this evidence, adherents of the Warrant Model have a tough row to
hoe in claiming that the Fourth Amendment was understood in 1791 as
generally requiring warrants for seizures.
Warrant Model proponents are on somewhat firmer footing when it
comes to searches, but even here, they falter. Even assuming that warrants
were consistently thought during the framing period to be required for
searches of homes, there was no universal rule beyond that. For example,
customs statutes enacted by Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia during
the 1780s required that officials obtain a warrant to enter into “warehouses”
and “storehouses” as well as dwellings.73 But customs statutes in
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania during the same period permitted
warrantless searches of such premises, requiring warrants only for searches
of houses.74 Fans of the Warrant Model cannot explain why, within a span
of ten years, warrants for searches of non-premises dwellings went from
being an unnecessary encumbrance on customs officials to being a
constitutional necessity.
More broadly, the views of those who advocate a Warrant Model of the
Fourth Amendment are in very serious tension with the fact that the
Amendment was directed to the federal legislative branch, not the executive
or the judicial. When James Madison initially proposed the Bill of Rights in
the House of Representatives, he contemplated that its provisions would be
interspersed, each tacked onto the provision of the body of the Constitution
it was meant to alter, rather than added as a separate set of provisions at the
end.75 The Fourth Amendment was not intended to be added to Article II,
which one might expect if it were primarily a check on the executive. Nor
was it destined for Article III, which one would imagine it would be if
intended as a direction to judges about when to issue warrants. Rather, it was
originally contemplated that the Fourth Amendment would find a home in
Article I, § 9,76 along with the other prohibitions on the legislative branch.77
That the Fourth Amendment was directed to the national lawmaking
body tells us something very significant. For the Amendment is not a
72

See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1242–44.
See id. at 1262.
74
See id.
75
See Edward Hartnett, A “Uniform and Entire” Constitution; Or, What if Madison Had
Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 252–53 (1998).
76
See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 75, at 258–59; see also THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 223 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
77
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
73
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direction to judges about when to issue warrants or to executive officials
about how to search and seize. It is a constraint on Congress’s power to make
law regarding searches, seizures, and warrants. That power lay with the
States. The Fourth Amendment, it turns out, is more about federalism than
separation of powers.
II.

LOCAL CONTROL OF SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE LAW: FROM EMPIRE TO
CONFEDERATION TO REPUBLIC

History does not neatly dovetail with either the Warrant or the
Reasonableness Models. That is to say, history cannot tell us when warrants
are required by the Fourth Amendment. Are they required for every search
or seizure, except where impracticable? Or are they required only when a
search would be unreasonable without one? History cannot provide an
answer to this question because it is the wrong question. Both Warrant Model
and Reasonableness Model enthusiasts have assumed that the Fourth
Amendment provides a single, uniform rule as to when warrants are required.
However, history provides a third model of the Fourth Amendment that has
been overlooked. Members of the framing generation did not demonstrate
an overriding preference for warrants, but neither did they wish to subject
federal searches and seizures to a general requirement of reasonableness.
Rather, what they contemplated was local control over federal searches and
seizures.
The thirty-year period from 1761 to 1791 saw different expressions of
the idea that search-and-seizure authority should fall under local, not central,
control. This occurred under three different types of central government:
imperial, confederal, and federal. First, during the writs-of-assistance
controversy after 1761, local judges throughout the continent refused to issue
such writs, in defiance of orders from the Crown, and one colonial legislature
unsuccessfully tried to statutorily bar the writs.78 Then, in the brief Articles
of Confederation period, much of the state legislation ratifying the 1783
confederal impost explicitly held federal officers to differing search-andseizure restrictions. Finally, two pieces of early federal legislation explicitly
held federal officers to the standards of the States in which they operated,
demonstrating that such a patchwork approach was unremarkable in the early
Republic and suggesting that adherence to state law was itself considered the
78

It appears that the quest for local control over search-and-seizure policy began in some
colonies much earlier. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 194 (“Between 1620 and 1700,
New England legislators withheld the power to search or seize for many applications for which
Parliament permitted it . . . .”). I begin with the writs-of-assistance controversy of the 1760s
because the episode was “[t]he driving force behind the adoption of the [Fourth] Amendment.”
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990).
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constitutional floor set by the Bill of Rights.
A. LOCAL CONTROL UNDER THE EMPIRE: THE WRITS-OFASSISTANCE CONTROVERSY

It is almost uniformly thought that the writs-of-assistance controversy
of the 1760s was the single most important episode in colonial history to shed
light on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.79 A close examination of
this episode shows that the touchstone of the colonists’ complaints about the
writs was the loss of local control over search-and-seizure policy: that despite
their unquestionable legality in England, the writs were illegal in the
colonies. Moreover, not every colony agreed that the writs were unlawful,
and they were actually issued in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
and South Carolina.
Writs of assistance were akin to general search warrants.80 However,
they were especially pernicious in at least three respects. First, they could be
obtained by customs officials as a matter of course, without any allegation of
illegal activity.81 Second, they were issued “without judicial superintendence
and without the possibility of refusal.”82 Finally, they did not expire upon
seizure and return of stolen or untaxed goods but, instead, were operative
until six months after the death of the monarch under which they were
issued.83
79

See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth?: The Framers Preserved
Common-Law Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness” is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 51, 86 (2010) (observing that “[t]he controversy over the use of general writs of
assistance for revenue searches of houses was the far more important catalyst” for the Fourth
Amendment, as compared to the Wilkesite cases). But see Amar, supra note 27, at 772
(asserting that the series of English Wilkesite cases of the 1760s “and not the 1761 Boston
writs of assistance controversy . . . was the paradigm search and seizure case for Americans”).
However, Amar seems later to have acknowledged, at least in part, the significance of the
writs-of-assistance controversy in interpreting the Fourth Amendment. See Amar, Writs of
Assistance, supra note 31, at 76–77 (acknowledging that the “later writs-of-assistance
controversies” outside of Massachusetts after 1767 “were . . . more significant at the time than
the 1761 Boston cases”). For a succinct description of the Wilkesite cases and their impact in
the colonies, see Davies, supra note 37, at 562–65.
80
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 378 (observing that “[t]he customs service in
Massachusetts” had used such “writs as general warrants”); O.M. Dickerson, Writs of
Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40, 40
(Richard B. Morris ed., 1939) (“The writs were general in form . . . .”).
81
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 380.
82
Id..
83
See id. at 380–81; Dickerson, supra note 80, at 40; NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 54
(1937) (“The more dangerous element of the writ of assistance . . . was that it was not
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Such writs were used in Massachusetts beginning in 1755 by customs
officials searching for untaxed goods.84 However, a controversy arose with
the death of King George II in late 1760 and the consequent expiration of all
extant writs of assistance in the spring of 1761.85 When new writs were
requested in Massachusetts by English authorities, a group of Boston
merchants resisted and hired prominent Boston attorney James Otis to
represent them.86 In the proceeding before the Massachusetts Superior Court
that became known as Paxton’s Case, Otis provided the first full account of
the perniciousness of general warrants and offered a persuasive defense of
specific warrants as an alternative.87 He argued: “For Felonies an officer may
break, upon Proscess [sic], and oath. — i.e., by a Special Warrant to search
such a House, sworn to be suspected, and good Grounds of suspicion
appearing.”88
Paxton’s Case is best viewed as the culmination of a century-long push
in Massachusetts toward local control of search-and-seizure policy. As
Professor William Cuddihy pointed out, Otis’s legal arguments in favor of
specific warrants were severely flawed. Neither statutory nor English
common law demanded that warrants be specific.89 Rather, general warrants
and writs of assistance were the norm in Britain, not an aberration.90
Moreover, it was unmistakably clear that English law applied to
Massachusetts in that respect.91 Otis’s mistake—or, perhaps, his gambit—
was to conflate established English law with evolving Massachusetts law.
The colony had enacted local legislation that, over the course of the prior

returnable at all after execution, but was good as a continuous license and authority during the
whole lifetime of the reigning sovereign.”); QUINCY, supra note 48, at 397 n.5 (“Writs of
assistance continue in force until the demise of the Crown, and for six month afterwards.”);
see also CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 393 (observing that “regular search warrants were of limited
duration” under English law).
84
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 378–79; Dickerson, supra note 80, at 40.
85
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 380–81; QUINCY, supra note 48, at 414 n.2; Dickerson,
supra note 80, at 40.
86
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 381; Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John
Adams, his Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 992 (2011).
87
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 382 (observing that Otis’s “proclamation that only
specific writs were legal was the first recorded declaration of the central idea to the specific
warrant clause”); Clancy, supra note 86, at 992 (“[N]o authority preceding Otis had articulated
so completely the framework for proper search and seizure practices that was ultimately
embodied in the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause.”).
88
QUINCY, supra note 48, at 471.
89
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 386–94.
90
See id. at 392 (observing that “writs of assistance typified [British] law”).
91
See id. at 388–89.
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century, had become increasingly hostile toward general warrants.92 Otis’s
argument elided the growing gulf between Massachusetts law and English
law.93 Only according to the former were specific warrants favored.94
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Otis lost and the Massachusetts Superior Court ruled
that writs of assistance could issue.95
In his January 4, 1762 Boston Gazette piece, Otis attempted to support
his argument that customs officials in Massachusetts should be required to
use specific warrants, despite the fact that they were permitted to use general
warrants in England. His argument focused on the relative degree of control
over customs officials in the respective locales. In England, he pointed out,
customs officials were subject to the complete control of the court of
exchequer, even extending to physical discipline when necessary: “In
England the exchequer has the power of controuling them in every respect;
and even of inflicting corporal punishment upon them for mal-conduct . . . .”96
As such, they were accountable to the court of exchequer and were called to
account on a weekly basis for their conduct.97 Accordingly, the people had
effective control over customs officials in England and had “a short and easy
method of redress in case of injury receiv’d from them.”98 But no such
“checks and restrictions” existed in Massachusetts, “and therefore the writ of
assistance ought to be look’d upon as a different thing there, from what it is
here.”99 As Otis put it, the writ of assistance gave the customs officer greater
power in Massachusetts than in England, “greater because
UNCONTROUL’D—and can a community be safe with an uncontroul’d power
lodg’d in the hands of such officers[?]”100
It is in the colonial response to Paxton’s Case where we see most
dramatically a push toward local control of search-and-seizure policy. Not
only did the local responses generally frustrate the policy of the central
92
See id. at 392 (“Hostility to general warrants had been increasingly evident in the
colony’s legislation on search and seizure for more than a century.”).
93
See id. (“Otis ignored mounting disparities in the legislation of Massachusetts and
Britain toward search and seizure . . . .”).
94
See id. at 393 (“[T]he specific warrant . . . reigned supreme only in Massachusetts . . . .”);
see also Maclin, supra note 54, at 945–46 (observing that the writs “contradicted local law”).
95
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 395; QUINCY, supra note 48, at 414 n.2; Dickerson, supra
note 80, at 40.
96
QUINCY, supra note 48, at 493.
97
See id. (“[T]hey are the proper officers of that court, and are accountable to it as often
as it shall call them to account, and they do in fact account to it for money receiv’d, and for
their BEHAVIOR, once every week . . . .”).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 494.
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government, but the responses differed in important respects by colony. In
Massachusetts, a legislative response was attempted. The legislature there
passed a bill in March 1762 to nullify the decision in Paxton’s Case by
essentially transforming writs of assistance into specific warrants.101 The bill
would have “limited the duration of writs of assistance to seven days, based
them on oath, and required that they designate the informer, the accused
owner of contraband, and the alleged place of concealment.”102 That is to
say, it would have transformed general writs of assistance by instilling them
with the salient characteristics of specific warrants. Although the measure
was vetoed by the governor, it stands as an example of “an effort to compel
British customs officers to observe the restraints on searches that their local
counterparts already accepted.”103 Thus, the Massachusetts legislature
sought to subject British customs officials to the same constraints that bound
local officials.
Responses in other colonies were varied. After passage of the
Townshend Acts in 1767,104 aimed in part at endowing colonial courts with
jurisdiction to issue writs of assistance,105 most of the colonial judiciaries
were forced to confront the issue, and they did so in diverse ways. In a large
number of colonies, judges either refused to grant the writs, ignored requests
for them, or engaged in dilatory tactics in the hopes that customs officials
would give up. Courts in Maryland chose largely to ignore the requests.106
The Rhode Island Superior Court used indefinite delay to frustrate customs
officials.107 Like those in its neighbor to the east, judges in Connecticut also
“postpone[d] consideration of the writs,” though arguably this was in a good
faith effort to determine their legality.108 Later, judges in Connecticut
101

See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 403; QUINCY, supra note 48, at 495–96; Clancy, supra
note 86, at 1002; Maclin, supra note 54, at 947.
102
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 403. For the text of the bill, see QUINCY, supra note 48, at
495–96.
103
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 403–04.
104
See, e.g., Revenue Act 1767, 7 Geo. 3 c. 46.
105
See Clancy, supra note 86, at 1003.
106
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 513, 526 (“In Maryland . . . the highest court[] had
ignored rather than refused requests for the writs.”); accord Joseph R. Frese, Writs of
Assistance in the American Colonies: 1660–1776, at 246 (1951) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author); see also Dickerson, supra note 80, at
62 (observing that Maryland court expressed willingness to issue writ but not until the need
arose in a particular case).
107
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 514, 524, 526 (“Asked repeatedly for the same writs,
the Rhode Island Superior Court . . . postponed considering them on grounds that two of its
members were absent.”); Dickerson, supra note 80, at 50–51; cf. QUINCY, supra note 48, at
505–06 (concluding that no writs were issued in Rhode Island).
108
Accord QUINCY, supra note 48, at 501–04; Dickerson, supra note 80, at 52–53; see

MANNHEIMER_FINAL PROOF

272

4/5/18 8:33 PM

MANNHEIMER

[Vol. 108

responded to requests for writs by offering to issue them as specific
warrants.109 And in Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court outright refused to
issue the writs, branding them “illegal,” both because they were general110
and because they were perpetual.111 As in Connecticut, judges in
Pennsylvania offered to grant them as specific warrants,112 and did in fact do
so in particular cases.113
By contrast, judges in Virginia, Georgia, New York, and South Carolina
were more equivocal. Virginia courts, taking a middle-of-the-road approach,
granted writs that were general but that were acceptable to colonial
sensibilities in other respects: they were of definite duration rather than
perpetual and were issued only when based on sworn allegations.114 As in
Virginia, the judges of Georgia expressed a willingness to issue general writs,
but refused to do so unless the need arose in a particular case.115 In South
Carolina, judges initially publicly avoided responding to requests for writs of
assistance while privately concluding that they were illegal.116 However, in
1773, the newly reconstituted high court of South Carolina ruled the writs
legal and issued a number of them.117 In New York, the situation was
reversed: judges there initially issued writs118 but later practiced the same
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 514–15; Frese, supra note 106, at 239–40 (quoting the chief justice
as declaring that “they were not clear that the thing itself was constitutional”).
109
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 520–21, 525.
110
See id. at 519; Frese, supra note 106, at 264, 286.
111
Accord QUINCY, supra note 48, at 509; see CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 515–16;
Dickerson, supra note 80, at 58–60.
112
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 525; Dickerson, supra note 80, at 60; Frese, supra note
106, at 264, 277; see also Davies, supra note 37, at 566 (“[C]olonial judges usually ignored
or denied the petitions [for writs of assistance] and often described the requested general writs
as ‘illegal’ notwithstanding specific statutory authority.”).
113
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 519–20; Frese, supra note 106, at 264–68.
114
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 521–22, 525–26; Dickerson, supra note 80, at 67–72.
Both Quincy and Frese mistakenly referred to these as specific writs. QUINCY, supra note 48,
at 510 n.14; Frese, supra note 106, at 270. However, an essential feature of a specific warrant
is a “prior designation of a particular person or location to whom or which the warrant [i]s
confined.” CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 313. It is this essential feature that was lacking in the
writs issued in Virginia pursuant to the Townshend Act. See Frese, supra note 106, at 270
(quoting writ as permitting entry “into any House, Shop, Cellar, Warehouse or Room or other
place where the said goods are suspected to be concealed”) (emphasis added).
115
See Frese, supra note 106, at 279; see also CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 523, 525;
Dickerson, supra note 80, at 65–66.
116
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 518; see also Dickerson, supra note 80, at 66
(documenting delay by South Carolina court in issuing writs).
117
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 524–25; Davies, supra note 79, at 88; Dickerson, supra
note 80, at 66–67; Frese, supra note 106, at 289.
118
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 513; Dickerson, supra note 80, at 54. Quincy first
observed that writs were issued in New York, but later asserted that the writs in New York
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kind of intransigence seen in Rhode Island119 and finally outright refused to
issue them.120
Thus, judicial reaction to requests for writs of assistance differed by
colony. Though it is tempting to see the colonial opposition as uniform,
unified, and monolithic, the record discloses a more nuanced picture,121 as
demonstrated in Table 1 below. Judges in four colonies—Connecticut,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island—either staunchly refused to
issue the writ or frustrated Crown policy through dilatory tactics and
subterfuge. In Georgia, too, judges essentially defied the Crown, paying lip
service to general warrants by expressing their willingness to approve them
but only if particular need arose. In Virginia, judges willingly granted hybrid
writs that, while general, were acceptable in other ways to colonial
sensibilities, such as being of limited duration and founded upon specific
allegations made under oath. Again, this was done in defiance of Crown
policy,122 but with more diplomacy. And in Massachusetts,123 New
Hampshire,124 New York,125 and South Carolina126 judges actually issued the
were issued as specific warrants. QUINCY, supra note 48, at 507–08, 511 n.15. This latter
assertion appears to be incorrect. The form of the writ issued in New York is reproduced in
full in Dickerson, and it is phrased as a general warrant. Dickerson, supra note 80, at 54–55;
see also CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 513 (showing that the writs issued in New York were
“phrased as general search warrants”). Moreover, the court’s order, reproduced in Frese
demonstrates the breadth of the authority granted:
[Y]ou are hereby authorized . . . in the Day time to enter . . . any Ship Boat [sic] or other
Vessell as also into any House Warehouse Shop Cellar or other place in this Colony . . .
and to seize . . . any kind of Goods or Merchandizes whatsoever prohibited to be
imported or Exported or whereof the Customs or other Duties have not been and shall
not be duly paid.
Supra note 106, at 243 (emphasis added).
119
Accord Dickerson, supra note 80, at 58; Frese, supra note 106, at 263–64, 276; see
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 523 (“Judges pleaded illness, age, and inclemency of weather for
absences that precluded a necessary quorum.”).
120
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 526 (“[T]he New York Superior Court [announced] in
1773 that it had pronounced [the writs] not warranted by law . . . and that it would not
comply.”); see also Frese, supra note 106, at 277, 285–86.
121
See Davies, supra note 79, at 88 (observing that “colonial court rulings” were
“inconsistent”).
122
See Dickerson, supra note 80, at 69 (“Here was apparently a judicial defiance of a
direction of the attorney general in England and a departure from the known practice of the
Court of Exchequer.”).
123
See Clancy, supra note 86, at 1004 (“Massachusetts continued to issue general writs
of assistance . . . .”); see also MAURICE H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 468–72
(1978) (documenting use of writs granted in Massachusetts after 1767).
124
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 509.
125
See supra text accompanying notes 116–118.
126
See supra text accompanying notes 118–119.
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writs, although those in the last two States changed their position over time.127
Table 1. Colonial Courts’ Responses to Crown Officials’ Requests for
Writs of Assistance After Passage of Townshend Act of 1767
Refused

Ignored

Delayed

request

Offered to

Issued as

Offered to

Issued as

Issued

issue as

specific

issue as

non-

writs

specific

warrants

non-

perpetual,

request for

perpetual,

oath-based,

writ by

warrants

Insufficient
data or no

oath-based,

general

Crown

general

warrants

officials

warrants

NY
PA

MD
SC

CT
NY
RI

CT
PA

PA

GA

VA

MA
NH
NY
SC

DE
NJ
NC

Judicial intransigence in some colonies was accompanied by footdragging and interference by executive officials. In one instance, faced with
indefinite delay by the Rhode Island Superior Court in considering writs,
customs officials went to the governor, only to be delayed further by the
actions of the governor, the judge advocate, and a deputy sheriff.128
Ultimately, a writ was issued as a specific warrant, but night fell before it
could be executed, allowing locals to remove the sought-after contraband.129
In Connecticut, the chief justice who had politely declined to issue the writs
based on doubts about their legality also served as lieutenant governor of the
colony.130 And when the British attempted “to remove him from his judicial
office” based on the notion of separation of powers, the people of the colony

127

It is unclear whether writs were ever issued in New Jersey, but the preponderance of
scholarly weight indicates that they were not. Compare CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 512 (“At
least one writ of assistance . . . operated in New Jersey during the post-Townshend period.”),
with QUINCY, supra note 48, at 508 (“[T]he records of the court [in New Jersey] which are in
quite a perfect state, contain no evidence of any writs having been issued . . . .”), and
Dickerson, supra note 80, at 49 (“There is no evidence that writs were ever applied for in New
Jersey . . . .”), and Frese, supra note 106, at 244 (“We have no record of a general writ issued
in New Jersey.”). It appears that writs of assistance were not requested in the two remaining
colonies, Delaware and North Carolina. See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 511–12.
128
Frese, supra note 106, at 237–39; see also CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 514.
129
See Frese, supra note 106, at 237–39; CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 514.
130
Frese, supra note 106, at 242.
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blocked the attempt.131 In Pennsylvania, the chief justice sought and obtained
the opinion of the colony’s attorney general, who agreed with him that the
writs were illegal.132 In Virginia, the governor himself was on the court that
permitted general but limited writs.133
As had occurred in Massachusetts, the colonial legislatures sometimes
became involved. For example, in Connecticut, the chief justice, opining that
“the superior court could do nothing contrary to the sense of the people,”
suggested that the General Assembly of the colony take up the issue of the
legality of the writs.134 The General Assembly took the chief justice up on
his proposal, appointed a committee to study the question, and ultimately
punted based on the committee’s conclusion that the matter “properly
belonged to the Superior Court.”135 Privately, however, the General
Assembly “advised the judges not to grant the writs.”136
Accordingly, the writs-of-assistance controversy represents an episode
in which local control over search-and-seizure policy was strongly asserted
against the central government, in this case the Crown. Paxton’s Case clearly
held the writs to be legal in Massachusetts, and the Townshend Act likewise
clearly extended their legality to the rest of the colonies.137 Yet, centralized
search-and-seizure policy was frustrated, and local policy made supreme, by
the actions of local officials: legislative, executive, and judicial. It is
tempting to look back upon the writs-of-assistance controversy and see a
widespread revolt by the colonists against the use of general warrants. With
all the benefits of hindsight, we know that general warrants were widely
deemed unlawful by 1791,138 as their prohibition in the Fourth Amendment
demonstrates. Yet general warrants were not universally reviled on this side
of the Atlantic in the 1760s. Some States continued to use them even after
Independence.139 And, as shown above, general warrants were issued to
Crown officials in more than half—six out of ten—colonies for which data
are available. A more nuanced view of the writs of assistance controversy
shows that it was largely about holding Crown officials to whatever standards
local officials preferred. True, the specific issue raised by the writs-of131

Id.
Id. at 245.
133
Id. at 269.
134
Id. at 260.
135
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
136
Id.
137
See supra text accompanying notes 93, 102–103.
138
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 739–42.
139
See id. at 628 (discussing use of general warrants in early 1780s in Pennsylvania and
Virginia).
132
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assistance controversy—the legality of general warrants—was ultimately
settled in a uniform way by the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause.
However, the controversy stands for the more general proposition that the
colonists sought not continent-wide rules, but simply local control of Crown
officials.
The colonial response during the writs of assistance episode also refutes
Professor Amar’s argument that warrants were seen during the framing
period as a bad thing, not a good thing. First, Otis’s central argument in
Paxton’s Case—the initial colonial response to British assumption of power
to obtain writs of assistance—was not that British officers must act without
warrants and hold themselves vulnerable to suit. Rather, it was that they must
obtain specific warrants.140 After Otis lost, the attempted legislative response
in Massachusetts was in the same vein: to allow only those writs of assistance
that met the requirements of limited duration, oath, and specificity.141
Moreover, of the four colonies with the strongest judicial reaction against
issuing writs (Connecticut, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island),
judges in two (Connecticut and Pennsylvania) issued them or offered to issue
them as specific warrants instead.142 It is impossible to view their response
as anti-warrant.
B. LOCAL CONTROL UNDER THE CONFEDERATION: STATE
LEGISLATION RATIFYING THE 1783 CONFEDERAL IMPOST
RESOLUTION

Americans continued, after the Revolution and before ratification of the
Constitution, to assert local control over search-and-seizure policy.
Specifically, during the Articles of Confederation period, state legislation
ratifying a 1783 confederal impost resolution demonstrates the importance of
State control over search-and-seizure rules. On April 18, 1783, the
Confederation Congress recommended that it be “vested with the power to
levy duties on certain imported goods, such as rum, tea, sugar, coffee, wine,
and molasses.”143 The resolution required ratification by each and every State
140
See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text; see also Maclin, supra note 20, at 224
(“Otis emphasized that the absence of judicial oversight was one of the prime evils inherent in
the writs.”); Maclin, supra note 54, at 968 (“In his argument against the writs of assistance,
Otis did not condemn all warrants. He stated that special or specific warrants were
reasonable.”).
141
See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
142
See supra notes 107–111 and accompanying text.
143
Michael J.Z. Mannheimer, Harmelin’s Faulty Originalism, 14 NEV. L.J. 522, 538
(2014) (citing 24 J. CONT. CONG. 1774–1789, at 256, 256–57 (1783) reprinted in THE
RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS OF THE 18TH OF APRIL, 1783: RECOMMENDING THE STATES TO
INVEST CONGRESS WITH THE POWER TO LEVY AN IMPOST, FOR THE USE OF THE STATES; AND THE
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before it could take effect.144 The ratifying legislation tells us much about
the way the rights ultimately expressed in the Fourth Amendment in 1791
were viewed within the previous decade.
Eight of the States that passed legislation ratifying the confederal impost
included therein what can be called “mini-bills of rights” that explicitly
required that the confederal government abide by certain search-and-seizure
rules in enforcing the impost regulations.145 Five—Georgia, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia—required the confederal
government to obtain a search warrant, though not necessarily a specific one,
in order “to break open any dwelling house, store or ware-house.”146
Pennsylvania’s legislation was somewhat less protective than this baseline,
requiring a warrant (again, not necessarily a specific one) only for “dwelling
house[s].”147
The other two States that enacted explicit search-and-seizure constraints
on the confederal government—North Carolina and Rhode Island—imposed
more stringent requirements. First, they included all premises within the
prohibition.148 Additionally, these two States required that such warrants be
specific:149 Rhode Island required that the warrant “particularly
discriminat[e] the dwelling-house, store, ware-house, or other building,”150
and North Carolina provided that a warrant could be granted with regard to
“such house” where uncustomed goods were suspected of being.151
Finally, of the five States that did not include a “mini-Bill of Rights,”
only New York and New Jersey did not place any implicit constraints on the
LAWS OF THE RESPECTIVE STATES PASSED IN PURSUANCE OF THE SAID RECOMMENDATION,
TOGETHER WITH REMARKS ON THE RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS, AND LAWS OF THE DIFFERENT
STATES 4 (1787) [hereinafter IMPOST LAWS]).
144
IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at 6; see Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and
Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104, 1113 (2013) (discussing similar 1781 resolution);
see also JACKSON T. MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781–
1788, at 73 (1961). Ultimately, the 1783 Impost Resolution did not take effect because New
York refused to ratify it in a form acceptable to the Confederation Congress. See Campbell,
supra note 144, at 1120–26; infra text accompanying notes 163–165.
145
Mannheimer, supra note 143, at 538; IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at 7, 10, 12–13,
30–31, 40, 42, 44–45, 48.
146
IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at 7, 10, 40, 44, 48 (emphasis omitted).
147
Id. at 31.
148
Id. at 13, 42 (Rhode Island: “any . . . other building”; North Carolina: “any other
place”).
149
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 663 (“Like North Carolina, Rhode Island had not only
tied enforcement of the Congressional impost to warrants but also demanded that those
warrants be specific.”).
150
IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at 13 (Rhode Island) (emphasis omitted).
151
Id. at 42 (emphasis omitted).
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confederal government in collecting the impost.152 The other three required
that the confederal government follow the respective state constitutions in
collecting the impost. Delaware required that “such rules and ordinances for
collecting and levying the . . . duties . . . be not repugnant to the constitution
and laws of this state,”153 and Maryland similarly required that “such
ordinances, regulations and arrangements . . . for the faithful and punctual
payment and collection of the . . . duties . . . shall not be repugnant to the
constitution of this state.”154 Connecticut’s legislation set forth this
requirement in a more roundabout way by directing its citizens to adhere to
confederal impost regulations except to the extent that they were
“inconsistent with the constitution and internal police of this state.”155
Moreover, because the Delaware and Maryland constitutions required the use
of specific warrants, their legislation ratifying the confederal impost required
the same.156
In sum, as illustrated in Table 2 below, ten of the thirteen States in ratifying
the 1783 confederal impost regulation required confederal authorities to
obtain warrants supported by oath157 in collecting the impost. But only four
of those ten—Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, and Rhode Island—
required, expressly or by necessary implication, that those warrants be

152

Id. at 17–22.
Id. at 32.
154
Id. at 37.
155
Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted). This provision appears incongruous at first blush, for
Connecticut had no constitution at the time its impost ratification legislation was adopted in
May 1784. See George C. Thomas, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James
Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451,
1465 n.63 (2005). Apparently, the provision referred to Connecticut’s unwritten constitution
(i.e., its common law on search and seizure). See Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 (Conn. 1787),
(outlawing general warrants based on state common law).
156
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 663–64 (“The remaining states simply instructed
Congress to observe their constitutions in collecting the impost, automatically preventing the
federal usage of general warrants in Maryland and Delaware.”). Although general warrants
were later deemed illegal in Connecticut, see Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 (Conn. 1787),
(“[T]he warrant in the present case, being general, to search all places, and arrest all persons,
the complainant should suspect, is clearly illegal . . . .”), at the time the Connecticut impost
ratification legislation was adopted in May 1784, it appears that general warrants may still
have been consistent with Connecticut law. See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 644 (“By 1787,
Connecticut was the last significant outpost for promiscuous searches and seizures in [New
England].”).
157
In addition to those whose impost-ratifying legislation expressly required warrants
issued only upon oath, both the Maryland and Delaware constitutions, incorporated by
reference in those States’ legislation, contained this requirement. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 76, at 234.
153
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specific,158 while the other six did not. The States also differed as to what
types of premises could be searched only by warrant: Pennsylvania’s warrant
requirement applied only to dwellings; Georgia, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia applied their requirement to stores
and warehouses in addition to dwellings; North Carolina, and Rhode Island
applied it to all buildings; and it is unclear how far Delaware’s and
Maryland’s respective warrant requirements extended. In addition, while
nine of these ten required that searches be conducted in daytime, Delaware
did not.159 Furthermore, although Connecticut did not require that confederal
officials obtain warrants before searching, it did require that they adhere to
state law generally. Only New Jersey and New York would have left officials
to their own devices when searching and seizing pursuant to the confederal
impost legislation. And because New York refused to ratify the legislation
unless its own officials (who, obviously, would have to abide by state law)
would enforce the impost,160 New Jersey stood alone in declining to constrain
the search-and-seizure authority of confederal officials in enforcing the
proposed impost legislation.
Table 2. Search-And-Seizure Constraints Placed by States on
Confederal Authorities in Impost Ratification Legislation, 1783–86
Requirement

Requirement

Requirement

Requirement

Requirement

Requirement

No

that confederal

that confederal

that confederal

that confederal

that confederal

that State

constraints

authorities

authorities

authorities

authorities

authorities

authorities

on

obtain specific

obtain specific

obtain warrant

obtain warrant

adhere to state

enforce impost

confederal

law

warrant to

warrant to

to search

to search

search any

search; unclear

dwelling,

dwelling

building

what premises

storehouse, or

this applied to

warehouse

NC
RI

DE
MD

GA
MA
NH
SC
VA

PA

CT

authorities

NY

NJ

158
See Maclin, supra note 54, at 949. Professor Maclin incorrectly dates the proposed
impost legislation to 1787 instead of 1783.
159
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 747 (“[D]elaware’s legislation after 1776 ignored
[nighttime searches], neither allowing nor prohibiting.”).
160
See infra text accompanying notes 164–166.
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Two conclusions follow. First, under the Articles, twelve of the thirteen
States sought to control the search and seizure authority of the central
government. Second, they did so in different ways: some expressly required
warrants while some did not; some required that those warrants be specific
while some did not; some required warrants for all premises, some for
dwellings, warehouses, and storehouses, and some only for dwellings; some
forbade nocturnal searches while some did not; and some laid down explicit
rules while some required adherence to state law generally. Thus, as late as
1786161—five years before the Bill of Rights was adopted—a patchwork of
search-and-seizure rules, different in significant respects, was contemplated.
This crazy quilt of rules that varied by State meant that national officials were
to be constrained in different parts of the country in different ways depending
upon the State in which they acted.162 Accordingly, Americans of that period
were quite accustomed to the idea that national officials would be subjected
to different search-and-seizure rules on a State-by-State basis.
One might argue that this arrangement under the Articles of
Confederation is weak evidence of what was contemplated by the
Constitution. The Constitution, after all, was developed as an antidote to the
anemic government under the Articles, a centralizing force in stark contrast
to the decidedly de-centralizing Articles. This assertion, however, misses the
entire point of the Bill of Rights. The Bill was a concession to the AntiFederalist opponents of the Constitution who had feared that it would
consolidate too much power in the hands of the federal government at the
expense of the several States.163 While the Constitution represented a move
toward centralization, the Bill of Rights represented a countervailing step
toward the kind of de-centralization epitomized by the Articles. That is to
say, in much the same way that the centripetal forces inherent in the
Constitution were areaction to the de-centralizing tendencies of the Articles,
pulling the Nation together, the centrifugal forces embedded in the Bill of
Rights were in reaction to the centralizing tendencies of the Constitution,
161

The Rhode Island legislation was passed in 1786. IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at

11.
162

Although the collectors of the impost were initially to be appointed by each respective
State, after having been appointed they were “amendable to, and removable by the United
States in Congress assembled, alone.” Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted). Moreover, if a State failed
to make appointments within one month after receiving notice, the appointment was to be
“made by the United States in Congress assembled.” Id. Because, after appointment, these
officials served at the pleasure of Congress, they are properly characterized as national
officers. Indeed, that was the main sticking point upon which the impost resolution ultimately
failed. See infra text accompanying notes 164–166.
163
See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1278–84.
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allowing for some differentiation by States to be preserved. As the
Constitution drew the Nation in and imposed uniformity, the Bill of Rights
carved out spheres where variety and diversity could be retained.
Indeed, the proposed impost law of 1783 is a prime example of why the
Articles of Confederation failed, but not because of the search-and-seizure
constraints placed upon the confederal government by the States. True, the
Articles of Confederation failed largely because they required unanimous
consent for any significant legislation, such as the proposed impost. But
despite the conditions placed by the States upon the confederal collectors of
the impost, each State but one was deemed by the Confederation Congress to
have ratified the proposal.164 Only the purported ratification by New York
was deemed at such a variance with the impost proposal that it was not
accepted as a ratification of it.165 New York’s nominal ratification of the
impost was rejected because New York insisted that the collectors of the
impost within New York be considered agents of New York, supervised by
and answerable only to that State.166 Congress deemed congressional
superintendence over the impost collectors to be “an essential part of the
plan.”167 To put it another way, the confederal Congress readily accepted the
condition placed upon ratification of the legislation by eleven of the thirteen
States that state search-and-seizure policy control collection of the impost. It
was only when New York demanded in addition the right to select and
superintend the personnel responsible for collecting the impost that the
Congress balked.
Accordingly, the impost, and in a larger sense, the Articles, were
doomed because one State refused to entrust national actors with a national
duty, not because eleven other States required those national actors to play
by local rules. To the contrary, the requirement that central officials obey
local search-and-seizure rules seems to have been uncontroversial. After all,
that is precisely what the colonies had sought in the 1760s.
Finally, observe that the States’ conditional ratification of the 1783
confederal impost legislation demonstrates a clear preference for warrants,
164
See IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at 66 (“All the states except New-York hav[e] in
pursuance of the recommendation of the 18th [of] April, 1783, granted the impost by acts
vesting this power, with certain qualifications, exclusively in the United States in Congress
assembled . . . .”).
165
See id. at 67 (determining that the New York legislation “so essentially varies from the
system of impost recommended by the United States in Congress assembled on the 18th day
of April, 1783, that the said act is not, and cannot be considered as a compliance with the same,
so as to enable Congress, consistently with the acts of the other states to bring the system into
operation”).
166
See Campbell, supra note 144, at 1124.
167
IMPOST LAWS, supra note 143, at 66; see also Campbell, supra note 144, at 1124.
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all but eviscerating Professor Amar’s claim that warrants were actually
disfavored by the framers and ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment. Ten of the
thirteen States implicitly or explicitly required that confederal officers obtain
warrants prior to searching or seizing.168 These measures were passed in
order to hem in the authority of confederal excise collectors, not to immunize
them from suit. If Professor Amar and his adherents were correct, those
States would have forbidden the use of warrants, leaving confederal officers
open to common-law tort suits for trespass in state courts. Instead, they
required warrants. Thus, in the decade before the Fourth Amendment was
adopted, the warrant was viewed primarily as a constraint on central
authority, not as a get-out-of-jail-free card.
C. LOCAL CONTROL UNDER THE REPUBLIC: CONTINGENT FEDERAL
SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE AUTHORITY IN EARLY LEGISLATION

Two early pieces of federal legislation, the Judiciary Act of 1789 and
the Militia Act of 1792, specifically granted federal officers the same searchand-seizure authority that analogous state officers had under the laws of the
respective States. That is to say, federal legislation contemplated that federal
officers would have different search-and-seizure authority depending upon
the State in which they acted. Once again, this time following ratification of
the Constitution, we see the assertion of local norms binding actors of the
central government vis-à-vis search-and-seizure. While this falls short of
definitive proof that the Constitution similarly establishes different limits on
search-and-seizure authority by State, the absence of any statutory language
setting a constitutional floor strongly implies that Congress meant these
statutes to track the constitutional limits on federal search-and-seizure
authority.
First, section 33 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, enacted by the First
Congress, provided that
for any crime or offence against the United States, the offender may, by any justice or
judge of the United States, or by any justice of the peace, or other magistrate of justice
of any of the United States where he may be found agreeably to the usual mode of
process against offenders in such state . . . be arrested.169

The act thus empowered federal officers “to accomplish seizures and
arrests through the usual legal processes of their resident states.”170 The term
168

See supra text accompanying note 156.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (emphasis added).
170
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 750; see also Gerald V. Bradley, The Constitutional Theory
of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 854 (1989) (“[V]arious accoutrements of
federal search and seizure, including arrest, forms of writs, their execution, and modes of
process, were subjected to prevailing rules of the state in which the federal court was
169
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“usual mode of process” was understood by contemporary lawyers as
referring to arrest warrants,171 which explains why the statute is directed to
judicial officers. And Congress had within its ranks a sufficient number of
lawyers to impute this meaning to them.172 Accordingly, as the Bill of Rights
was being debated, Congress “assumed the applicability of state laws and
practices governing” the power of federal officials to make arrests.173
Then, in 1792, the Second Congress passed the Militia Act, section nine
of which granted federal “marshals of the several districts and [their]
deputies . . . the same powers in executing the laws of the United States, as
sheriffs and their deputies in the several states have by law, in executing the
laws of their respective states.”174 While the Judiciary Act of 1789 dictated
that federal power to issue and execute arrest warrants would track state law,
the Militia Act provided that federal power to otherwise search and seize
would generally do so as well, except as provided by more specific federal
legislation, such as the Collection Act of 1789 and the Excise Act of 1791.175
Professor Thomas Davies has set forth the claim that section nine of the
1792 Militia Act did no more than confer upon federal marshals the power
that local sheriffs had under common law “to call out a posse comitatus of
citizens (that is, the local militia) to suppress riots or insurrections.”176
However, the plain meaning of section nine could not be clearer: federal
marshals and their deputies were granted “the same powers” in enforcing
federal lawthat local law enforcement officers have in enforcing state law.
This certainly comprehends the power of raising a posse comitatus, but it
located.”); Davies, supra note 79, at 104 (“[T]he early Congresses . . . did not enact standards
for criminal warrants or warrantless arrests; instead, the Judiciary Act of 1789 simply directed
federal courts and officers to use the mode of ‘process’ . . . used in the state in which they
served.”).
171
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 753; see also Davies, supra note 79, at 104 (observing that
the term “mode of ‘process’ . . . would include warrants”).
172
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 753 (“The Framers of the Fourth Amendment included
so large a cross-section of legal talent that they must have equated ‘mode of process’ with the
procedures of arrest and seizure that most contemporary lawyers understood.”).
173
See id. (“Although th[e] statute did not mention arrest warrants, they were the linchpin
of the ‘mode of process’ that it acknowledged.”).
174
Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 9, 1 Stat. 264, 265 (1792).
175
As discussed more fully infra text accompanying notes 193–241, the 1789 Judiciary
Act and the 1792 Militia Act are much more reflective of the limits placed on federal search
and seizure authority by the Fourth Amendment than are the Collection Act of 1789 and the
Excise Act of 1791. The latter two Acts, and particularly the 1791 Act, were highly partisan
pieces of legislation representing the political dominance of the Federalists in Congress in the
very early days of the Republic. As such, one cannot infer from these statutes any consensus
view of the Fourth Amendment.
176
See Davies, supra note 37, at 611; see also Davies, supra note 79, at 157 n.491; Davies,
supra note 65, at 355–56.
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goes well beyond that power. The Supreme Court has consistently
interpreted this provision as granting federal officers all the law enforcement
powers of a local sheriff, not just the posse comitatus power.177 Scholars
generally agree with this interpretation.178
Professor Davies argues that since ordinary citizens had the same
common-law power to make arrests as did constables and sheriffs, section
nine of the Militia Act would have been superfluous had it granted federal
marshals warrantless arrest power. After all, federal marshals and their
deputies had no less inherent authority than private persons.179 This argument
overlooks two salient points. First, it is true that the common law permitted
ordinary citizens to make warrantless arrests. But, as of 1792, there was some
dispute over whether and to what extent common-law precepts applied to the
new federal government.180 Accordingly, it was unclear to what extent, if at
all, ordinary citizens could make warrantless arrests for federal crimes.
Given this lack of clarity, Congress would have wanted to give explicit
direction to federal officers that their power to arrest for federal crimes
matched state officers’ power to arrest for state crimes.
Second, the 1792 Act goes beyond granting federal officers warrantless
arrest authority and grants them all “the same powers in executing the laws”
enjoyed by state officers. This includes several powers generally denied to
ordinary citizens.181 Perhaps most importantly, state officers generally
enjoyed the power to execute search warrants, whereas private persons did
not.182 It is true, as Professor Davies points out, that section 27 of the
177
See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 420 (1976) (interpreting section nine of
the Militia Act as “giving United States marshals the same power as local peace officers to
arrest for a felony without a warrant”); accord Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,
339 (2001).
178
See, e.g., Amar, supra note 27, at 764 (“In 1792 . . . the Second Congress explicitly
conferred th[e] common law arrest power on federal marshals.”).
179
See Davies, supra note 65, at 355 (“[F]ederal marshals inherently possessed the same
common-law warrantless arrest authority possessed by any private person, which is pretty
much all that state sheriffs possessed.”); accord Davies, supra note 59, at 157 n.491.
180
See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1269–73.
181
See Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at 57–59.
182
This appears to have differed by State. Compare WILLIAM W. HENING, THE NEW
VIRGINIA JUSTICE 403 (1795) (instructing that search warrants “ought to be directed to
constable, and other public officers . . . and not to private persons . . . .”), and ELIPHALET LADD,
TO THE HONOURABLE THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 358 (1792) (Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Vermont) (similar), and JAMES PARKER, THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR,
THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 324 (1792) (New Jersey, New
York, and Pennsylvania) (similar), and PETER FRENAU, THE SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE 425 (1788) (similar), with FRANCOIS X. MARTIN, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 280 (1791) (North Carolina) (“A search warrant is a justice’s order . . .
directed to a lawful officer or any indifferent person, commanding him to search a house, or
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Judiciary Act of 1789 had already granted federal marshals and their deputies
the authority “to execute throughout the district, all lawful precepts directed
to him, and issued under the authority of the United States.”183 Presumably,
this included search warrants. However, section nine of the 1792 Militia Act
goes one step further and grants federal officers the equivalent power to
execute such warrants as their state counterparts. Moreover, relying upon
section 27 of the 1789 Judiciary Act is a double-edged sword for Professor
Davies, given that that section already empowered federal marshals “to
command all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty.”184 This
encompassed the common-law posse comitatus power,185 rendering
superfluous the single grant of power Professor Davies suggests was given
by section nine of the 1792 Militia Act.
In addition, eighteenth-century justice of the peace manuals take pains
to differentiate between the arrest powers of government officials and those
of private persons. So, for example, one such manual published the same
year that the Militia Act took effect states that “all persons” must apprehend
a felon if the felony is committed in their presence, but only “a watchman
may arrest a night walker” and only “a constable may ex officio arrest a
breaker of the peace in his view.”186 While private persons could halt an
ongoing affray, they had no power to arrest the affrayers once the tumult had
concluded.187 Nor, according to the 1792 manual, could such a person break
doors to a private home to stop an ongoing affray. Those powers lay
exclusively with state officers.188
houses, therein particularly named, for stolen goods.”) (emphasis added).
183
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87 (1789); see Davies, supra note 37,
at 611.
184
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87.
185
See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1979 (1983) (“In the Judiciary Act of 1789,
Congress . . . gave each [federal] marshal ‘power to command all necessary assistance in the
execution of his duty,’ including the power to call out a posse comitatus.”) (footnote omitted);
see also Nathan Canestero, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse
Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 110 (2003); Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse
Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383, 392
(2003); David B. Kopel, The Posse Comitatus and the Office of Sheriff: Armed Citizens
Summoned to the Aid of Law Enforcement, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 796 (2015);
Jason Mazzone, The Commandeerer in Chief, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 265, 315–16 (2007);
Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft
in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 16 (2008).
186
LADD, supra note 182, at 40–41.
187
See id. at 41; accord Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at 57.
188
See LADD, supra note 182, at 44 (“Where an affray is made in a house, in the view or
hearing of a constable, he may break open the doors to take them.”) (emphasis added); accord
Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at 57. One might quibble that these provisions

MANNHEIMER_FINAL PROOF

286

4/5/18 8:33 PM

MANNHEIMER

[Vol. 108

Likewise, although private persons and state officials alike could arrest
for felonies, state officials generally had greater power to break doors to
arrest for felonies than did private persons. In particular, a private person
could not break doors to arrest “barely upon suspicion of felony,” while “a
constable in such case may justify.”189 While an ultimate finding of guilt of
the arrestee could retroactively justify the private person’s breaking of doors
in such an instance,190 one could hardly say that the power of the private
person and the state official were equivalent: only the latter could, on
suspicion of felony, break doors to arrest even an innocent person.
At all events, even pursuant to Professor Davies’s interpretation, federal
officers were bound by state law search-and-seizure standards, at least
regarding warrantless arrest authority, whether by virtue of the 1792 Act or
otherwise.191 Indeed, Professor Davies goes so far as to observe that changes
in the underlying state law of search and seizure over time would necessarily
also alter the authority of federal marshals to search and seize.192
In sum, while the Fourth Amendment would dictate that a federal
warrant must be particularized, founded upon oath, and issued only on
probable cause,193 the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Militia Act of 1792
together provided that state law would determine the rest: whether the

mention only “constables” while the 1792 Militia Act gives federal marshals the same powers
as local “sheriffs.” However, the sheriff was denominated as the “principal conservator of the
peace” for the county. LADD, supra note 182, at 384. As such, he could “apprehend . . . all
persons who break the peace, or attempt to break it.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1783). Like all conservators of the peace, part of his duty was
“in suppressing . . . affrays.” Id. at 354. Accordingly, sheriffs enjoyed the same power of
halting affrays and arresting affrayers as did constables.
189
LADD, supra note 182, at 43; see also Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at 57.
Again, while the manual uses the word “constable,” sheriffs were undoubtedly entitled to the
same justification. After all, the rationale behind allowing constables such a justification was
that they could be punished if they refused to perform their duties while private persons had
the authority to arrest but in most cases were not compelled to. See LADD, supra note 182, at
43. But sheriffs, in this respect, were in the same position as constables. See id. at 41 (“The
warrant is ordinarily directed to the sheriff or constable, and they are indictable, and subject
thereupon to a fine and imprisonment, if they neglect or refuse it.”) (emphasis added).
190
LADD, supra note 182, at 42–43; see also Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at
57.
191
See Davies, supra note 79, at 104 (“[S]tate common law continued to set the standards
for warrantless arrests by federal officers . . . .”); Davies, supra note 59, at 210 (“Prior to the
1930s . . . warrantless arrests by federal officers . . . were subject to the law of the state in
which the arrest was made.”).
192
Davies, supra note 59, at 191 n.599 (“[C]hanges in state warrantless arrest law were
probably understood to automatically expand the warrantless arrest authority of many federal
officers . . . .”).
193
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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warrant could be served nocturnally, whether prior announcement was
required, whether and to what extent the arrestee’s person and effects could
be searched, where and under what circumstances a warrant could be
dispensed with, and so forth. And this state of affairs existed continuously
from the earliest days of the Republic until the mid-1930s, when Congress
first explicitly granted federal officers general search-and-seizure authority
untethered to underlying state law.194
No discussion of early federal search-and-seizure law would be
complete without reference to the Collection Act of 1789,195 the Act of
August 4, 1790,196 or the Excise Act of 1791.197 The Collection Act permitted
customs searches of ships without a warrant based on “reason to suspect” that
goods subject to duty were concealed therein.198 The 1790 Act, which
effectively repealed the Collection Act but “imposed similar restrictions” on
federal officers,199 permitted warrantless and suspicionless searches of ships.
The 1791 Act permitted searches of “houses, store-houses, ware-houses,
buildings and [other] places” without warrant if those premises were
registered as places where distilleries were located.200 Assuming that these
Acts shed light on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,201 they would cut
against the claim that the Amendment ties the search-and-seizure authority
of the federal government to that of each respective State. After all, the Acts
permit warrantless searches of vessels, commercial buildings, and even
homes, without taking account that such searches might be illegal under local
law. And, indeed, the Court and a number of scholars have argued that the
Acts do tell us how the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted. This
194
See, e.g., Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 595, 48 Stat. 1008, 1008; Act of June 15, 1935, ch.
259, § 2, 49 Stat. 377, 378; see also Davies, supra note 37, at 611–12 (“Congress never
explicitly authorized marshals to make warrantless arrests until 1935.”); accord Davies, supra
note 65, at 356. One might argue that, because the 1789 and 1792 Acts require federal officers
to follow state law, the Fourth Amendment cannot impose that requirement, for then the
legislation would be superfluous. But the Amendment establishes a rule of limitation, while
the legislation is a grant of power. The legislation granted federal executive officers searchand-seizure power up to the limits of the Amendment. Absent the legislation, federal officers
would have had no special powers to search or seize beyond that which was provided to
ordinary citizens in each State.
195
Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 (1789).
196
Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145 (1790); see also Act of Feb. 18, 1793,
ch. 8, § 27, 1 Stat. 305, 315 (1793).
197
Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199 (1791).
198
Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789).
199
Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History, Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1707, 1742 (1996).
200
Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, §§ 25, 26, 29, 1 Stat. 199, 205–07.
201
But see infra text accompanying notes 193–241.
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assertion is based on the following syllogism: the same men who drafted both
these statutes also drafted the Fourth Amendment; they would not have
drafted statutes that they believed violated the Fourth Amendment; therefore,
we must assume that men who drafted the Fourth Amendment believed that
it permitted the searches allowed by the statutes.202
However, the syllogism is faulty.203 First, while the federal statutes were
enacted by Congress, to say the same of the Fourth Amendment is a great
oversimplification of the process by which the Bill of Rights was adopted.
While mere legislation has only drafters, a constitutional amendment has
both drafters and ratifiers. To ascribe some meaning to the latter, one must
consult not just the Members of Congress who voted for it but also the
members of the legislatures of the three-fourths of the States that ultimately
ratified it.
More importantly, the Federalists, who dominated the First Congress,
were opposed to a Bill of Rights.204 The Bill was adopted only to placate
moderate Anti-Federalists, who demanded it as the price for ratification.205
While Congress was given the task of determining the precise wording of the
amendments, the ideas that those words represent were dictated to Congress
by the Anti-Federalists. In Professor Gerard Bradley’s seafaring analogy:
“[T]he intentions of the whale (the anti-federalists) are more important than
202

As early as Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886), the Court employed this
syllogism: “As [the Collection Act] was passed by the same [C]ongress which proposed for
adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body
did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable’ . . . .” Typical of the same
logic employed by commentators is this passage from Professor Cuddihy regarding the
Collection Act:	
  
The Collection Act of 1789 was most significant because it identified the techniques of
search and seizure that the framers of the [Fourth] [A]mendment believed reasonable
while they were framing it. Congressional consideration of the search warrant section
of that act commenced only twelve days before the [A]mendment originated, and that
section became law just three weeks before the [A]mendment assumed definitive form.
The Collection Act explicated the Fourth Amendment for both documents expressed
the thoughts of the same persons upon the same subject at the same time.
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 737–38; see also Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at 59
(“[H]istorical exceptions to a blanket requirement come from the First Congress—the same
body that drafted the Fourth Amendment itself.”); Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1289–90
(“[N]umerous federal statutes from the Framers’ era authoriz[ing] warrantless civil
searches . . . evidence that neither the Framers nor other political leaders from their generation
believed that a warrant was usually required for a valid search.”).
203
See Davies, supra note 37, at 606 (“Numerous commentators have accepted
uncritically [the] assumption that the 1789 statute reflected the Framers’ understanding of the
Fourth Amendment.”).
204
See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1266–67.
205
See id. at 1278–84; see infra text accompanying note 243.
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those of the ship’s crew (the First Congress, especially Madison). What does
the whale demand? What will satisfy him and make him go away?”206 In
order to interpret the Bill of Rights, we cannot look only, or even primarily,
to what the First Congress may have believed it was doing.
Given the Federalist/Anti-Federalist split in the First Congress, it is far
from clear that there was any kind of consensus over whether these statutes
were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Unfortunately, the records of
debates and votes on these items from the First Congress are largely lost to
history.207 Accordingly, it is disingenuous for supporters of the view that
these Acts shed light on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to put the
burden of proof on those who disagree.208 Because the records of the debates
are sparse or non-existent, it is impossible to prove one way or the other how
much controversy was caused by the search-and-seizure provisions of these
early Acts of Congress.
Moreover, all the available evidence suggests that these provisions were
viewed by opponents as of dubious constitutional validity. For example,
suspicionless searches of ships must have been seen as of questionable
constitutionality, given that Americans of the period increasingly viewed
their ships as akin to their dwellings in terms of their expectations of
privacy.209 There is a recorded instance of this sentiment as early as 1734.210
The years of the writs-of-assistance controversy also saw a concomitant
“ardent public hostility” toward shipboard searches.211 In the years just
preceding the Revolution, “Americans increasingly regarded not only houses
but ships as castles.”212 It is inconceivable that by 1790, the sentiment of a
large chunk of the population, identifying ships as areas deserving of a
quantum of privacy approaching that of the home, had simply vanished such
that the 1790 Act represented a consensus view of the Fourth Amendment.
206

Bradley, supra note 170, at 834–35.
See Davies, supra note 37, at 711 n.470 (observing this “serious gap in the historical
record” regarding the 1789 Collection Act); id. at 713 n.471 (“[T]here is no record of any
debate in the Senate regarding the 1791 Excise Act, and the record of the debate in the House
of Representatives regarding the procedural aspects of the Act is quite limited.”); see also
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 737 n.257 (“The documentation on the Collection Act mentions no
debates of its sections concerning search and seizure. [D]ebates of those sections either never
occurred or were not recorded.”).
208
See, e.g., Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 31, at 59 (“If any Member of Congress
objected to or even questioned these warrantless searches and seizures on Fourth Amendment
grounds, supporters of a warrant requirement have yet to identify him.”).
209
See Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1299–1303.
210
See id. at 1300 (“In 1734, a South Carolinian contended that ‘my house is my castle,
and so is my ship.’” (quoting S.C. GAZETTE, Nov. 2–9, 1734, at 2)).
211
Id. at 1302.
212
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 591.
207
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The 1791 Act in particular “was widely perceived as overly intrusive of
privacy.”213 According to Francis Wharton, the Act “produced at once great
opposition, both in and out of Congress.”214 “A majority of the southern and
western members [of Congress], even before the bill was passed, proclaimed
an organized agitation for its repeal . . . .”215 The few statements we have of
House members debating the search provisions of the 1791 Act illustrate this:
Virginia Anti-Federalist Representative Josiah Parker216 objected to the
provisions regarding “the mode of collecting the tax” as being “hostile to the
liberties of the people.”217 In vivid terms, he warned that the collections
provisions would “let loose a swarm of harpies, who, under the denomination
of revenue officers, will range through the country, prying into every man’s
house and affairs, and like a Macedonian phalanx bear down all before
them.”218 Representative James Jackson, an anti-administration Federalist
from Georgia,219 also opposed the Act as “unfriendly to the liberties of the
people.”220 Even some generally pro-administration Federalists were against
the Act on constitutional grounds. Representative John Steele of North
Carolina,221 for example, complained that the proposed Act would subject
citizens “to the most unreasonable, unusual and disgustful situation of having
their houses searched at any hour of the day or night.”222
After the Act became law, it “triggered apocalyptic protests”223 and was
“assailed violently from the country at large.”224 Maryland, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia “united in solemn declarations of rooted dislike,
and of resistance” amounting to, in some cases, “nullification.”225 Delegates
from Pennsylvania’s western counties remonstrated to Congress and the
Pennsylvania legislature that “[i]t is insulting to the feelings of the people to

213

Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1308 (emphasis omitted).
FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 102 (1849).
215
Id.
216
See John H. Aldrich & Ruth W. Grant, The Antifederalists, the First Congress, and the
First Parties, 55 J. POL. 295, 323 app. 1 (1993).
217
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1844 (1791).
218
Id.; see Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1309.
219
See Aldrich & Grant, supra note 216, at 322 app. 1.
220
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1846.
221
See Aldrich & Grant, supra note 216, at 323 app. 1.
222
DAILY ADVERTISER, June 22, 1790, at 1; see Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1308 n.117.
These remarks do not appear in 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1642–43.
223
CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 743.
224
WHARTON, supra note 214, at 102.
225
Id.
214
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have their . . . houses . . . ransacked.”226 Subsequently, one essay appearing
in a New York newspaper, apparently reprinted from a North Carolina paper,
objected that, pursuant to the Act, “every citizen’s house in the United States,
is liable to undergo the insult of a search.”227 The essay continued that the
Act “lays open the peaceable dwellings of the inhabitants of a country to the
entrance, insults and rudeness of a set of unprincipled excisemen,” and
“disturb[s] the peace and happiness of their families by the entering,
searching and ransacking their houses and closets, by a set of rude and
insulting excisemen.”228
The opposition to the 1791 Excise Act soon turned violent. Barely three
months after the Act went into effect, Robert Johnson, collector of revenues
for Pennsylvania’s western counties, was attacked by a mob of “armed men,
who stripped him, cut off his hair, tarred and feathered him,” and stole his
money and his horse.229 After a complaint was filed against members of the
mob in federal court, a man attempting to serve the papers relating to the
litigation was tarred and feathered, had his horse and watch stolen from him,
and was blindfolded and tied up in the woods for five hours.230 Such acts of
terrorism in opposition to the Excise Act continued in Western Pennsylvania
for three years until, in 1794, opposition ripened into armed insurrection, put
down only when President Washington called in the militia.231 For this, a
number of insurgents were later tried for treason and sentenced to hang.232
When people burn down federal buildings, and torture and kill federal agents
because of the intrusiveness of a federal law, one can reasonably infer that
they were upset by the law when it was passed.233 It is inconceivable that the
provisions of the 1791 Excise Act represent anything resembling a national
consensus on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The point here is not
that the Excise Act was unconstitutional because it was controversial. It is
rather the more modest proposition that we cannot simply assume that the
Excise Act was constitutional simply because it was enacted by the same
226

Pittsburgh, Sept. 10, INDEP. GAZETEER, Sept. 24, 1791, at 3; see Arcila, Jr., supra note
37, at 1308–09.
227
Extract from Observations in a North-Carolina Paper “On the Assumption and Excise
Law,” NEW YORK DAILY GAZETTE, Feb. 2, 1793, at 3 [hereinafter Extract from Observations];
see Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1308.
228
Extract from Observations, supra note 227, at 3.
229
WHARTON, supra note 214, at 105.
230
See id.
231
See id. at 110–17; Arcila, Jr., supra note 37, at 1309.
232
See WHARTON, supra note 214, at 172–83.
233
See LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, HAMILTON, Cabinet Battle #1 (Atlantic Records 2015)
(“Look, when Britain taxed our tea, we got frisky. Imagine what gon’ happen when you try
to tax our whiskey.”).
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Congress that proposed the Fourth Amendment.
More broadly, it is sometimes easy to forget that America’s first
congressmen were politicians who belonged to political parties that often
disagreed with one another, sometimes vehemently. More particularly, the
sentiments of the Anti-Federalists, those who had opposed the Constitution
and still favored States’ rights vis-à-vis the central government, were alive
and well in the First Congress.234 Pro-administration Federalists, who desired
to empower the federal government with robust authority, constituted a
majority of the First Congress.235 But the opposition was strong, and AntiFederalists constituted a sizeable minority.236
Moreover, much of the legislation considered in the First Congress was
seen as carrying over the issues from the ratification debates, and particularly
the question of federalism.237 Fundamental questions about the nature of the
young Republic were inherent in virtually every issue debated in the First
Congress,238 and debate revolved around a Federalist/Anti-Federalist axis.239
Not only was there often a Federalist/Anti-Federalist dividing line on
important legislation in the First Congress, but the 1791 Excise Act was the
work of none other than high Federalist Alexander Hamilton,240 whom AntiFederalists despised.241 It blinks reality to think that the sizeable minority of
Anti-Federalists in Congress blithely accepted as constitutional the intrusive
search provisions of an Act whose architect was the hated Secretary of the
Treasury. Indeed, opposition to Hamilton was one point around which AntiFederalists could rally; they generally voted as a united bloc against his

234
See Aldrich & Grant, supra note 216, at 296 (“Th[e] ‘regime question’ remained open
in the 1790s, although its focus shifted from the merits of the Constitution itself to which of
the potential tendencies within the Constitution’s framework would prove dominant.”).
235
See id. at 313 (“[P]ro-administration Federalists were a majority in the First
Congress . . . .”).
236
See id. (observing that opposition to the majority in the First Congress “was typically
quite large, and anti-federalists provided much of that opposition”).
237
See id. at 301 (contending that issues addressed in the First Congress “kept alive, and
were understood as, issues raised in the ratification debates [including] the distribution of
power . . . between the general and state governments”).
238
See id. at 302 (“Almost every issue before the House was debated partially in terms of
its effect on the character of the republic.”).
239
See id. at 310 (“All of the major issues facing the First Congress had been anticipated
before and during the ratification campaign, and they provoked arguments in the House along
Federalist-antifederalist lines.”).
240
See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 736 & n.254.
241
See Jonathan Turley, Reflections on Murder, Misdemeanors, and Madison, 28
HOFSTRA L. REV. 439, 442 n.21 (1999) (“[T]he Jeffersonians . . . hated Hamilton as the
personification of the Federalist cause.”).
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proposals.242 Together with anti-administration Federalists, they were almost
able to defeat those proposals.243
In the First Congress, the Bill of Rights, on the one hand, and ordinary
legislation, on the other, were simply on two different political trajectories.
The former, though necessarily blessed by the Federalist majority, was an
Anti-Federalist project.244 The latter generally subordinated the concerns of
the minority Anti-Federalists as part of the Federalist project of building a
powerful central government. This gives us a good reason to resist the facile
notion that the expansive federal search authority created by the First
Congress was necessarily consistent with the limitations on federal search
authority embodied by the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, it blinks reality to suggest any type of consensus in the First
Congress, much less the Nation as a whole, that the Collection Act, the Act
of August 4, 1790, and, in particular, the Excise Act, were consistent with the
Fourth Amendment.245 It is not only that “early Americans did not always
practice what they preached”;246 it is also that they were preaching from two
different pulpits.
But one can hardly say the same of the local-control provisions of the
1789 Judiciary Act and the 1792 Militia Act. By declining to establish
federal search-and-seizure rules, and instead calibrating federal rules to those
of each respective State, Congress avoided the kind of controversy
engendered by the Collection and Excise Acts. Unlike the latter, the localcontrol provisions of the Judiciary and Militia Acts would have naturally
enjoyed the support of the minority Anti-Federalists, and obviously enjoyed
sufficient support from the majority Federalists to become law.
Of course, this legislation is evidence only of what members of the early
Congresses believed the Fourth Amendment permitted, not what they thought
it required. One might argue that compliance with section 33 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 or section 9 of the Militia Act of 1792 might put a federal officer
afoul of the Fourth Amendment if a State’s search-and-seizure rules fell
242
See Aldrich & Grant, supra note 216, at 299 (“[A]ntifederalist representatives . . .
tended to vote together in opposition to Hamilton’s proposals . . . .”).
243
See id. at 300 (observing that Anti-Federalists “formed a significant proportion of the
opposition forces that Hamilton’s supporters were barely able to defeat”).
244
See infra Section III.A.
245
See Maclin, supra note 54, at 951 (citing “conflict among the Framers as to the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment” as a reason not to take the Collection Act as evidence of the
Amendment’s original meaning). A final clue that the Excise Act in particular must have been
relatively divisive is the date of its enactment: March 3, 1791, the final day of the final session
of the First Congress.
246
Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse Than the Disease,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994).
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below a constitutional minimum set by the Fourth Amendment. Again, the
legislative history is sparse, and we must rely to a large extent on informed
speculation. But notice that the statutes themselves contain no proviso to
address that situation. Instead, the way they are written suggests that state
rules of search and seizure are the constitutional floor. At a minimum, these
statutes demonstrate that Americans of this time period were quite
comfortable with the idea that federal power be constrained by state law, even
if only as a matter of statute.
III.

THE SUPERIORITY OF THE LOCAL-CONTROL MODEL

A common thread runs through these three distinct episodes in early
American history: local control over search-and-seizure policy. These
attempts to reserve local control of search-and-seizure policy during these
three periods dovetail almost perfectly with the Anti-Federalist impetus
behind the Fourth Amendment. It was these opponents of the Constitution
who ultimately compromised, demanding a Bill of Rights with robust
protections for state norms as the price for their acquiescence to union. They
demanded that certain spheres of human activity be carved out of the
centralization agenda of the Federalists and be retained for local control. One
of those areas, because of the grave potential for abuse, was search-andseizure law and policy. In turn, what the Anti-Federalists had to say about
searches and seizures refutes both the Reasonableness Model and the Warrant
Model.
A. THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

It is true that, by its terms, the Fourth Amendment does not expressly
demand calibration of federal search-and-seizure policy to that of the States.
Instead, it prescribes the requirements for issuance of warrants and otherwise
demand that searches and seizures be “reasonable” (or, to be precise, not
“unreasonable”).247 But that very term “reasonable” “cries out for a
benchmark against which federal searches and seizures are to be
compared.”248 Where to find that benchmark? For the Anti-Federalists who
demanded adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the answer was simple: in the
search-and-seizure practices of the individual States.
The Anti-Federalists opposed the Constitution because they feared that
its concentration of power in the central government would lead to both the
annihilation of the state governments and the destruction of individual

247
248

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1284.
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liberty.249 Local government and individual rights were intertwined in their
mind: the States were positioned as the guarantors of freedom as against any
central government, be it the British Empire, the Confederation Congress, or
the proposed federal government.250 Every State had a Constitution, a Bill of
Rights, or at least a strong common-law tradition of protecting individual
liberty.251 A new central government that could act directly upon the
citizenry without having to go through the States would be able to bypass
these state-level protections of liberty.252 A Bill of Rights was required to
assuage these fears.253
Without the promise of a Bill of Rights, our nation might never have
been formed. At the outset of the ratification process, Anti-Federalists held
majorities in such key States as Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia.254
The Bill of Rights was the enticement needed to win over moderate AntiFederalists, who saw the flaws of the Articles of the Confederation but
desired to maintain some of its decentralizing attributes.255 The strategy
worked. In the battleground State of New York, for example, moderate AntiFederalist Melancton Smith and eleven of his followers were sufficiently
appeased by the promise of a Bill of Rights to sway them in favor of the
Constitution.256 The margin of victory was three votes.257 Simply put,
without the votes of these moderate Anti-Federalists, the United States might
not exist today, at least as we know it. The Bill of Rights thus should be
understood as it was contemplated by those who demanded its inclusion in
the Constitution in exchange for their votes in favor of ratification: as carving
out certain spheres for control by the several States.258
One of these spheres was search-and-seizure. Over and over, the AntiFederalists expressed anxiety at leaving search-and-seizure policy in the
hands of a new, powerful central government. First, they demanded a
prohibition on general warrants, as a consensus had developed by 1791 that
249

See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1263–64; Michael J.Z. Mannheimer, Cruel and
Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 69, 101–03 (2012).
250
See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1264–66; Mannheimer, supra note 249, at 101–02.
251
See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1264.
252
See id. at 1265; Mannheimer, supra note 249, at 103.
253
See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1268; Mannheimer, supra note 249, at 104.
254
See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1278; Mannheimer, supra note 249, at 108.
255
See Mannheimer, supra note 249, at 100.
256
See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1280–81.
257
See Richard B. Morris, John Jay and the Adoption of the Federal Constitution in New
York: A New Reading of Persons and Events, 63 N.Y. HIST. 133, 162 (1982); David E. Narrett,
A Zeal for Liberty: The Antifederalist Case Against the Constitution in New York, 69 N.Y.
HIST. 285, 289 (1988).
258
See Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1284; Mannheimer, supra note 249, at 109.
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such warrants were unlawful.259 However, their concern went beyond merely
the idea that warrants be specific, and encompassed anxiety over federal
executive officers’ search-and seizure authority more generally. Consider,
for example, Massachusetts Anti-Federalist John DeWitt’s warnings
concerning potential federal authority to be given to federal tax collectors.
He wrote:
They [Congress] are to determine, and you are to make no laws inconsistent with such
determination, whether such Collectors shall carry with them any paper, purporting
their commission, or not—whether it shall be a general warrant, or a special one—
whether written or printed—whether any of your goods, or your persons are to be
exempt from distress, and in what manner either you or your property is to be treated
when taken in consequence of such warrants. They will have the liberty of entering
your houses by night as well as by day for such purposes.260

That DeWitt was primarily concerned with local control of search-andseizure policy, and only as an ancillary matter with any particular aspect of
that policy, is evident from the way in which he began his discussion:
Congress is “to determine” all of the rules attending searches and seizures,
“and you are to make no laws inconsistent with such determination.” Read
this language in the light shone by Massachusetts’s unsuccessful attempt to
legislatively overturn the result in Paxton’s Case,261 and its later reservation
of local search-and-seizure law as applied to national officials in its
legislation ratifying the 1783 confederal impost.262 The problem, according
to DeWitt, was not simply that federal search-and-seizure policy might
contain features disliked by Bay Staters regarding warrantless searches, the
extent of seizures, the treatment of persons and property subject to seizure,
and nocturnal searches. The real problem was that Massachusetts would be
unable—as it had done in 1783 and attempted to do in 1762—to pass
legislation to do something about it.
Likewise, Patrick Henry in the Virginia ratifying convention despaired
of the loss of local control over searches and seizures. He observed that even
local sheriffs, although “under the watchful eye of [the Virginia] legislature,”
had “committed the most horrid and barbarous ravages on [the] people.”263
This had been met, with limited success, by state legislation “to suppress their
259

See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 739–43.
John DeWitt, To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts IV,
reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 29, 33 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)
(emphasis added).
261
See supra text accompanying notes 99–101.
262
See supra text accompanying note 143.
263
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 58 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1901) [hereinafter ELLIOTT’S
DEBATES].
260
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iniquitous speculations and cruel extortions.”264 He then raised the specter
of federal officers searching with impunity through every inch of the people’s
dwellings, of “harpies . . . aided by excisemen, who may search, at any time,
your houses, and most secret recesses.”265 Henry contrasted the attempts by
the state legislature to keep vigilant watch over wayward local sheriffs with
the unlikely prospect that such attempts by a national legislature would be
successful: “[I]f sheriffs, thus immediately under the eye of our state
legislature . . . have dared to commit these outrages, what would they not
have done if their masters had been at Philadelphia or New York?”266 Thus,
Henry argued that the national legislature and federal judges were far less
likely to constrain federal officers through legislation and common-law
rulemaking than were the state legislature and state judges. The premise of
this argument is a common refrain among the Anti-Federalists: that local
control enhances the accountability of government actors while centralized
power weakens political accountability.267 Consequently, according to
Henry, nothing would “tie [the] hands” of federal tax collectors and
excisemen vis-à-vis intrusive searches and seizures.268
Henry’s prescription for this problem was that such searches and
seizures should be subject to state, not federal, regulation. He made this clear
at another point during the Virginia ratifying convention, when he raised the
specter of a federal “exciseman . . . demand[ing] leave to enter [one’s] cellar,
or house, by virtue of his office.”269 He explained that he was unwilling to
abide such a potentiality “without any reservation of rights or control.”270
The best reading of Henry’s prescription of a “reservation of rights” and
“control,” pursuant to what ultimately became the Fourth Amendment, given
his other comments, is that he meant local control—legislative and judicial—
of federal officials. Such control, of course, had already taken place in
Virginia, in the form of local refusal to issue writs of assistance, perfectly
legal under English law, but which conflicted with local sensibilities.271
The statements made by the Anti-Federalists regarding their fears over
federal search-and-seizure policy, viewed in the light shed by the multiple
264

Id.
Id.
266
Id.
267
See Michael J.Z. Mannheimer, Self-Government, the Federal Death Penalty, and the
Unusual Case of Michael Jacques, 36 VT. L. REV. 131, 148–55 (2011) (exploring AntiFederalist view of accountability deficits flowing from large-scale Republic).
268
ELLIOTT’S DEBATES, supra note 263, at 57; see Mannheimer, supra note 35, at 1275.
269
Speech by Patrick Henry (June 14, 1788), in 3 ELLIOTT’S DEBATES, supra note 263, at
412.
270
Id.
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See supra text accompanying note 112.
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instances of the assertion of local control against central authority in the thirty
years straddling the framing period, thus support a local-control model of
Fourth Amendment protection. Such a model posits that the central concern
of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment was placing decisions
regarding search-and-seizure policy in the hands of the States rather than the
new central government.
B. THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS AND THE REASONABLENESS AND
WARRANT MODELS

The statements of Anti-Federalists such as John DeWitt and Patrick
Henry, and the more general sentiments of the Anti-Federalists, also largely
refute both the Reasonableness Model and the Warrant Model. Taking into
account the complete historical picture, a local-control model is superior to a
historical model that posits warrants as the touchstone of Fourth Amendment
protection, on the one hand, and one that holds the federal government only
to some nebulous standard of reasonableness, on the other.
One need go no further than the statements of DeWitt and Henry
discussed above to refute Professor Amar’s claim that the framers and
ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment were exclusively concerned with general
warrants and were unperturbed by warrantless searches. Notice several
things about the enlightening passage from DeWitt. First, he expressed
anxiety that federal tax collectors might have a “paper purporting their
commission,” i.e., a warrant, “or not.”272 That is, he expressed a concern that
tax collectors might act without warrant at all, in addition to expressing the
concern that such a warrant might be “general” rather than “special.”273
Moreover, he expressed concern about “whether any of [one’s] goods, or . . .
persons are to be exempt from distress.”274 Again, this goes beyond a concern
regarding the specificity of warrants and suggests that there might be
limitations on how “goods” and “persons” can be searched or seized even
with a warrant. DeWitt probably had in mind the precept, discernible from
Entick v. Carrington, that seizure of “mere evidence” of a crime, even
pursuant to warrant, was unlawful.275 Furthermore, DeWitt worried about
the manner in which persons and property are “to be treated when taken in
consequence of such warrants.”276 Again, the concern is not just with general
272

See supra text accompanying note 258.
See id.
274
See id.
275
95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). See also Amar, supra note 27, at 782 (asserting that a
warrant issued on probable cause “justified searches only for items akin to contraband or stolen
goods, not ‘mere evidence’”).
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See supra text accompanying note 258.
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warrants but also with the way in which they were to be executed.277 Finally,
he expressed a concern about nocturnal searches, which again goes to the
execution of search warrants as opposed to their generality or specificity.
Henry, too, was concerned not only with a federal official’s using
general warrants, but also with his not obtaining a warrant at all and executing
a search “by virtue of his office.”278 Indeed, Henry chose his words carefully.
By describing a potential warrantless search by a federal excise collector as
being “by virtue of his office,” he deliberately evoked the ex officio (that is,
warrantless) searches by British customs officials in the 1740s and 1750s that
incensed the people of Massachusetts and were a prelude to the writs of
assistance controversy.279 To those who clamored for a federal constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, “an ex officio search
and a writ of assistance search were two different sides of the same coin”
because “[b]oth allowed broad, discretionary . . . power without any
requirement of specific cause or judicial oversight.”280 Like DeWitt, Henry
also stoked fears of nocturnal searches, by conjuring up images of federal
“harpies . . . assisted by excisemen[,] ‘who may search, at any time.’”281
On the other hand, the confidence of Warrant Model adherents in
judicial control of executive officers is in sharp tension with the deep
suspicion that the Anti-Federalists felt toward the prospect of a federal
judiciary. It is true, of course, that colonial judges largely (though not
uniformly) sided with the colonists during the writs of assistance
controversy.282 However, these were the forerunners of state judges; federal
judges were another matter. Anti-Federalists continually complained that
“[t]he Constitution creates a powerful judicial branch that threatens the
integrity of state courts.” 283 Indeed, the major conflict during the first twenty
277

DeWitt may have had in mind warrantless searches incident to arrest. The common
law authority to conduct such a search was not nearly as well settled at the time of the framing
as modern Supreme Court decisions have made it out to be. Compare Mannheimer, supra
note 35, at 1252–53 (observing that search-incident-to-arrest authority was discussed in only
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1795), with Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (asserting that search-incidentto-arrest authority has “always [been] recognized under English and American law”).
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See supra text accompanying note 267; CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 683 (explaining that
Henry was concerned about federal excisemen searching “without warrant”).
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See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 363; Maclin, supra note 20, at 219.
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See Maclin, supra note 20, at 222–23.
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See CUDDIHY, supra note 2, at 683.
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years of the Republic over the existence of federal common law284 stemmed
at least in part over Anti-Federalist, and then Jeffersonian Republican,
distrust of federal judges. As Patrick Henry warned in his speech referenced
above, federal judges would be “sworn to support this [federal] Constitution,
in opposition to that of any state, and . . . may also be inclined to favor their
own officers.”285 Placing limits on federal executive officers that were to be
enforced by federal judges would have been, to the Anti-Federalists, putting
the foxes in charge of the henhouse. The notion that this was the central goal
of the Fourth Amendment is a creation of the twentieth century, not the
eighteenth.
The Fourth Amendment is not primarily about separation of powers. It
is mostly about federalism. Recall that Patrick Henry expressed support for
the idea that local sheriffs be kept “under the eye of [the] state legislature and
judiciary.”286 But the Anti-Federalists did not trust the federal legislature and
judiciary to restrain federal officers. Rather, the idea was to restrain federal
executives via the state legislature and judiciary, the former by formulating
search-and-seizure policy, and the latter by both controlling the issuance of
warrants and providing remedies for trespass (and, in doing so, building upon
the common law of search and seizure). This, after all, was exactly how the
writs of assistance controversy played out in most of the colonies: local
legislatures and judiciaries constraining the executive power of the Crown.
It was also at the heart of the state legislation ratifying the federal impost in
the 1780s, which forced state search-and-seizure policy, as formulated by
local legislatures and judges upon confederal enforcement officers. And it
was the strategy of section 33 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and section 9 of
the Militia Act of 1792, which required that federal agents generally abide by
state law when they search and seize.
To the Anti-Federalists, the Bill of Rights was largely about selfgovernment and local control of the policies that affected people most
directly. As Professor Gerard Bradley cogently observed: “‘[T]he right of
the people,’ specified by the [F]ourth [A]mendment, was not apprehended by
its ratifiers to refer to an individual’s ‘right’ to be governed by laws other
than those favored by the community’s desire and political authority to enact
them.”287 Search-and-seizure law is fundamentally about striking an
appropriate balance between liberty and security. And the Anti-Federalists
saw this as fundamentally a matter for each “community’s desire,” not
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national policy.288
By 1791, a consensus had developed throughout the United States that
general warrants were unlawful.289 Thus, the Fourth Amendment specifically
bans them. But no similar consensus had developed on many of the other
issues of search-and-seizure policy that had arisen, such as when warrants are
needed. On issues such as these, the history surrounding the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment points most strongly not toward a general warrant
requirement nor toward a general reasonableness standard, but to a regime of
local control of federal officials. It was a regime that most closely accorded
with the demands of the Anti-Federalists, whose support ultimately was
necessary to form the Union. And it was a regime that Americans in 1791
would have been used to.
C. AN ASIDE ABOUT INCORPORATION OF A LOCAL-CONTROL MODEL
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

One nettlesome problem is how to translate this local-control model into
a useable framework governing searches and seizures by state, rather than
federal, officials. If the Fourth Amendment is primarily about federalism and
thus preserves local control of search-and-seizure authority, one might
conclude that no effective constitutional constraint on state searches and
seizures can exist. While a complete response to this potential objection is
beyond the scope of this Article, some rough contours can be briefly sketched
out.
State searches and seizures are, of course, governed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.290 It is only through the legal fiction
of incorporation that we speak of the Fourth Amendment as applying to the
States. And, whatever else it might require, the core, irreducible command
that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of . . . liberty[] or property,
without due process of law” is that state executive officials must follow state
law in searching and seizing. Due process, on this view, is largely about
separation of powers, preventing the executive from depriving persons of
their interests in ways that are authorized by neither the legislative nor the
judicial branch.291
288

See Amar, supra note 27, at 818 (observing that local juries are optimally situated “to
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The core meaning of the Due Process Clause is that, before depriving
someone of life, liberty, or property, state officials must follow the law. This
is very similar to the view of the Fourth Amendment espoused by Warrant
Model enthusiasts that the central value of that Amendment is curbing
executive discretion. The difference is that those who espouse the Warrant
Model envision only a single way of curbing executive discretion, through
the judicial superintendence of the warrant process. But due process arguably
is more fluid and forgiving, allowing executives to act pursuant either to
judicial directives via warrant or to specific legislation permitting them to
undertake particular conduct under particular circumstances.292 And, of
course, police must also abide by search-and-seizure provisions of state
constitutions, which are often stricter than the Fourth Amendment itself.293
If due process means at its core that the police must follow state law in
conducting searches and seizures,294 then it means a lot. Indeed, if state
authorities violate the U.S. Constitution whenever they violate these
constraints—a position the U.S. Supreme Court unfortunately has
rejected295—the result is a sharp enhancement, not a diminishment, of
individual liberty.
One might object that an edict that police obey state law is, at the end of
the day, no protection at all. After all, a State that overvalues security and
undervalues liberty might decide to implement a totalitarian search-andseizure regime. But political process theory suggests that this fear is
overblown. Here, due process and equal protection constraints work in
tandem: not only must police obey the law, but that law must apply equally

property or restrain the liberty of a person . . . without legal authority arising either from
established common law or from statute.”).
292
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (opining that if a
State were to specifically authorize police to forcibly stop and disarm a person reasonably
suspected of having a concealed weapon, a police officer’s actions pursuant to that authority
would be constitutional).
293
See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548–49 (1986).
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The Court at one time suggested just such an approach to due process. See Barrington
v. Missouri, 205 U.S. 483, 486–87 (1907) (“[I]f . . . the admission of th[e] testimony did not
violate . . . the [C]onstitution and laws of the state of Missouri, the record affords no basis for
holding that he was not awarded due process of law.”). Though the Barrington Court held
only that adherence to state law was sufficient in providing due process of law, this suggests
that adherence to state law is also necessary in providing due process of law. Id.
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See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (holding that arrest by state police
officer based on probable cause but which violated state statute did not violate Fourth
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J., concurring in the judgment).

MANNHEIMER 1.DOCX

4/5/18 8:33 PM

2018] LOCAL-CONTROL MODEL OF FOURTH AMENDMENT

303

to all, including state legislators and their constituents. If the majority and
their political representatives do not wish to be subject to searches and
seizures without warrant and without cause, they cannot visit that treatment
upon outgroups.296 Again, the presence of search-and-seizure protections at
the state level strongly suggests that, when the law applies equally to all, at
least on a formal basis, the States are fully capable of striking an acceptable
balance between liberty and order.
The hedge “at least on a formal basis” in the preceding sentence points
up the most troublesome potentiality of such a view of how the Fourth
Amendment should apply to the States. For a State might implement a set of
search and seizure constraints weighed in favor of security at the expense of
liberty, formally imposing the associated burdens on everyone, but in fact
subjecting minorities and the politically unpopular to searches and seizures
at a much higher rate than members of the dominant group. Of course, such
a world is not difficult to imagine⎯in many ways, it is the one we inhabit.
To take one obvious example, the standard of reasonable suspicion required
for police to forcibly stop and detain citizens is a low one.297 Yet few white
people and people of means have to worry much about the inconvenience and
humiliation of being stopped and detained by the police, something that poor
people of color contend with on a daily basis.298
If the worst that can be said of this approach is that it replicates the status
quo, then so be it. But even under this model, a more robust form of
protection against arbitrary searches and seizures by the police can be
imagined. For example, courts might calibrate their scrutiny of searches and
seizures to the amount of discretion given the police, such that where people
of particular racial groups are disproportionately subjected to searches and
seizures, weightier race-neutral justifications are required when these
outcomes are the result of broad grants of law enforcement discretion. By
contrast, courts might be more deferential when the same outcomes result
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See William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1855 (2016) (justifying a model that determines
whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred by looking to positive law, in part, on the
ground that it is capable of tying “the neglected interests of those who face government
investigation to the much broader interests of society at large”); see also Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no
more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to
require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be
imposed generally.”).
297
See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (requiring only
“reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person . . . was
involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony” to forcibly detain someone).
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See generally Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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from tightly constrained discretion. And if broad discretion is inevitable,
minimal national standards might be required as a last resort. But this is far
different from making uniform national standards the default rule. Beyond
these initial thoughts, however, this Article leaves for another day the
problem of deriving constraints on the States from a federalism-driven Fourth
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Reasonableness Model adherents and Warrant Model advocates are
each part right and part wrong. The Fourth Amendment does subject federal
officials to a standard of reasonableness, not a regime of warrants. But it is
not a freestanding reasonableness standard to be constructed freehand by
federal judges. It is a standard of reasonableness tied to and established by
local law: statutes enacted by local legislatures, common-law doctrines
determined by local judges, and normative judgments made in particular
cases by local juries. By the same token, the Fourth Amendment does
sometimes require that federal officials use warrants. But they are required
to use warrants only when, and only to the extent that, their state counterparts
also fall under this obligation.

